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ABSTRACT 
Federal regulations have recognized that arc flash hazards are a critical source of 
potential injury. As a consequence, in order to work on some electrical equipment, the 
energy source must be completely shut-down. However, power distribution systems in 
mission critical facilities such as hospitals and data centers must sometimes remain 
energized while being maintained. In recent years the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis has 
emerged as a power system tool that informs the qualified technician of the incident 
energy at the equipment to be maintained and recommends the proper protective 
equipment to wear. Due to codes, standards and historically acceptable design methods, 
the Arc Flash Hazard is often higher and more dangerous than necessary.  
This dissertation presents detailed methodology and proposes alternative 
strategies to be implemented at the design stage of 600 volt facility power distribution 
systems which will decrease the Arc Flash Hazard Exposure when compared to widely 
used code acceptable design strategies. Software models have been developed for 
different locations throughout a power system. These software model simulations will 
analyze the Arc Flash Hazard in a system designed with typical mainstream code 
acceptable methods. The model will be changed to show implementation of arc flash 
mitigation techniques at the system design level. The computer simulations after the 
mitigation techniques will show significant lowering of the Arc Flash Hazard Exposure. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The first power systems in the early 1880s were created to provide a source of 
electricity for lighting. Thomas Edison’s invention of the light bulb and the direct current 
electrical system to power it was the beginning of the electrical generation industry. 
Edison not only invented the light bulb, but also the distribution network, switches, 
protective fuses, and insulating materials to make it all work. This was soon followed by 
the invention of the electric motor in the late 1880s, which rapidly increased the demand 
on the power system. Just a few years later, Nikola Tesla and George Westinghouse 
would prove that their alternating current system was technically superior, since it was 
able to be transformed to different voltages for transmission [1]. Soon after these electric 
systems came on-line, the first electrical shock from a commercial power system 
occurred. This led to the beginning of development for today’s safety codes and 
standards. 
 
1.1 Overview of Electrical Safety 
People quickly learned that electric shock was not the only hazard created by 
power systems. When equipment was not installed properly, a fire could erupt creating 
even more danger.  The novice contractors knew very little about electrical installations 
making the likelihood of a disaster high. The need for some form of guidance in the 
practice of electrical installation was evident. This was the beginning of what is now 
2 
 
known as the NFPA 70: National Electric Code (NEC), first published in 1897 [1]. This 
code is used regularly for electrical system design standards and installation methods. 
The plan review process and electrical inspections performed by building departments are 
also based on the NEC. 
Even with the proper electrical design and installation, accidents could possibly 
occur when people make contact with energized equipment. Throughout the years, people 
learned that electrical shock could cause serious injury and death. However, there was 
very little knowledge on the effects of electrical shock on humans. It was not until 1956 
that Charles Dalziel began performing shock experiments on animals and humans. His 
quest to find out how much electrical current was needed to stop a person from breathing 
or to stop a heart from working led to the information in Table 1.1 [2]. This work alerted 
humans to the risk of small amounts of electricity and increased safety awareness. 
Table 1.1 Reaction of Human Body to Electric Current 
AC Current Effect of Current 
0.7 – 1 mA Perception Threshold (tingling sensation) 
1.2 – 1.8 mA Slight Shock – not painful 
6 – 9 mA Shock – painful (no loss of muscle control) 
15 – 23 mA Shock – severe (muscle control loss, breathing difficulty) 
0.1 A Possible ventricular fibrillation (3-second shock) 
0.2 A Possible ventricular fibrillation (1-second shock) 
0.5 A Heart muscle activity ceases 
1.5 A Tissue and organ burn 
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The industrial revolution from 1950 to 1970 created enormous growth in the 
United States. With this expansion came many workplaces with little concern for 
employee safety. Based on Occupational Safety and Health Administration statistics from 
1970, there were 14,000 worker deaths that year from job related accidents [3]. Close to 
2.5 million workers would become disabled and 300,000 individuals would contract an 
occupational disease [3]. This prompted Congress to pass the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, leading to the formation of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). 
OSHA covers all employers and employees in the United States of America, with 
a few exceptions for self-employed people and family run farms. Among other things, 
OSHA, Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations addresses electrical safety. Typical of 
OSHA standards, this section gives a general requirement and not specific details on how 
to achieve the requirement. Initially, OSHA selected language from the NEC as a basis 
for the electrical regulations [1]. However, the NEC is aimed at design and installation 
practices and does not cover worker safety during equipment use. Therefore, a new code 
aimed at everyday worker safety on the job was needed. 
In 1976, the NFPA formed a committee at the request of OSHA to develop a new 
standard for electrical safety in the workplace. This resulted in NFPA 70E: Standard for 
Electrical Safety in the Workplace. The purpose of this standard is to provide a safe 
workplace for employees with regard to electrical safety. This gave OSHA a reference for 
electrical safety so employers could have a standard to follow. 
NFPA 70E, was the first standard responsible for instructing electrical 
maintenance personnel on how to work safely with regard to shock protection. This code 
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informed the worker of proper clothing, shoes, and rubber gloves. This code also gave 
guidelines for proper use of voltage measuring devices and insulated tools. Furthermore, 
NFPA 70E assigned given distances or boundaries from energized equipment that would 
give the workers a reference of where the clothing was to be worn. The electricians now 
had a strategy in place to protect themselves from electric shock. 
 
1.2  Importance of Arc Flash 
In time it became apparent that not all electrical accidents were due to electrical 
shock from making contact with energized devices. When an exposed energized 
conductor makes contact with the ground or another energized device, a small spark or a 
large explosion could ignite. This explosion, otherwise known as an arc flash, can have 
thermal energy that is dangerous from a distance of several feet away. One of the early 
papers addressing the arc flash was written in 1982 by Ralph Lee [4]. In this paper, Lee 
crossed the bridge between electrical shock from contact with energized devices, to 
thermal burn from the radiant heat output of electrical arcs. Lee’s paper presented 
theoretical methods for evaluating incident energy of an arc in open air. Additionally, 
Lee’s research explained the relationship between heat transfer from hotter to cooler 
objects and the importance of the distance between them. Lee’s paper goes on to develop 
a relationship between heat transfer and distance with its effects on human skin tissue.  
Acknowledging arc flash had several important consequences. First, electrical 
workers needed to protect themselves from the dangers of both shock hazards and arc 
flash thermal effects. Secondly, the workers needed to know what degree of potential 
electrical hazards they were being exposed to. Thirdly, workers would need to know the 
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proper protective clothing and equipment required to ensure their safety at a particular 
level of exposure. 
In time, the focus of arc flash hazard research turned toward predicting and 
calculating the incident energy produced. In 1998, Doughty, Neal, and Floyd did 
extensive research on the measurement and calculation of arc flash [5]. Their research 
detailed a testing program completed to measure incident energy from 6-cycle arcs on 
600 volt power systems. The testing led to algorithms for predicting incident energy 
based on available fault current and the distance from the source. These algorithms were 
shown to support Ralph Lee’s research. However, this testing also showed an increase in 
incident energy when the source is in an enclosure with an open door versus a source in 
open air, such as an overhead conductor. This proved important because most arcs occur 
when a person is standing in front of an open electrical enclosure and the arc is confined 
in the panel-board or switchgear. 
In 2000, the NFPA released a new version of NFPA 70E. This update recognized 
the existence of the “Arc Flash Hazard” and included a new protection strategy in 
addition to shock protection. There was now a section on Personal Protection Equipment 
(PPE) requirements and hazard risk tables. This standard identified specific electrical 
work activities and put them in five categories (0-4). Each category had a detailed 
clothing arc flash rating and additional equipment to be worn, such as hard hats and 
facemasks. However, this method of selecting protective equipment was based solely by 
task and not on actual knowledge of the arc flash hazard level at any location in the 
electrical system. 
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The findings detailed above, along with the focus of industry on electrical safety, 
led to the need for guidelines and standards addressing the arc flash. In 2002, The 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers published Standard 1584 “IEEE Guide 
for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations” [6]. This guide was a direct result of 
research conducted by the IEEE and was sponsored by large electrical corporations and 
manufacturers. The standard provided the first complete set of guidelines for calculating 
incident energy of the arc flash at the location of interest in a power distribution system.  
This was important because it provided a standardized way to calculate the arc flash 
hazard associated with working on energized equipment.  
By utilizing these calculation methods, an engineer is able to predict the thermal 
exposure at any location in an electrical system. The workers now have a guideline for 
protection from electrical shock and arc flash hazard. This is important because the shock 
protection protective equipment is made from specific materials to keep a person isolated 
from touching the energized equipment. The arc flash hazard protective equipment is 
made of materials that are designed to protect the worker from getting burned from the 
thermal effects of the arc flash. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
New electrically critical facilities, including computer data centers and hospitals, 
are electrically designed and constructed to have a continuous energy source. This is 
accomplished by integrating the electrical utility with on-site generators and 
uninterruptible power supplies. This electrical equipment must be serviced and 
maintained, but de-energizing the devices is not an option. The application of arc flash 
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mitigation techniques after construction can lead to additional equipment and expenses. 
Furthermore, there can be situations where an extremely high arc flash hazard is 
unavoidable. Implementing design strategies as described in this paper can minimize the 
arc flash hazard exposure at many locations throughout the electrical distribution system.  
This research focuses on the challenges of minimizing the arc flash hazard 
exposure to electricians working on energized electrical equipment in 600 volt and below 
power systems. Although the electrical systems analyzed in this dissertation are at 480 
volts, the 600 volt rating is important to the applicable standards for the voltage class. 
This work looks at the electrical system design requirements that are currently acceptable 
by the NEC and how this can expose electrical workers to a high arc flash hazard. These 
systems will be modeled using an industrial grade software package, which implements 
arc flash hazard calculations per IEEE-1584. Recommended design changes that include 
NEC and NFPA 70E requirements will be implemented and the systems will be re-
calculated to show significant decrease of the arc flash exposure. 
It is the researcher’s hypothesis that NEC acceptable design strategies can be 
altered to include NFPA 70E concerns, therefore minimizing Arc Flash Hazard exposure. 
This is specifically in the areas of: 
1. When applying the National Electric Code, Article 230, Part VI, always 
specify a single main circuit breaker for building shutdown. 
2. At the electrical service entrance the design shall specify enclosed low voltage 
power circuit breakers in place of fused disconnects. 
3. Specify adjustable low voltage power circuit Breakers for protection of step-
down transformers rated above 125kVA. 
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4. Step-Down Transformers larger than 125kVA shall be replaced with a design 
having two smaller kVA transformers. 
1.4 Contribution of the Dissertation 
The design techniques recommended in this dissertation are a result of 21 years of 
experience as a licensed professional engineer focusing on designing electrical systems 
and performing arc flash hazard studies. The outcome of this study can influence future 
design techniques that would consider NEC, NFPA 70E, and Arc-Flash hazard exposure. 
If the resulting information is transferred to a training environment for electrical system 
design engineers it can be implemented into their future projects. The implementation of 
these results can produce electrical systems with lower arc flash hazard at maintainable 
areas of a building electrical system. 
 
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of 6 chapters, with the first chapter introducing the 
development of electrical safety codes with regard to electrical shock and arc flash 
hazard. The history and development of the NEC, NFPA-70E, and IEEE-1584 are briefly 
discussed. The focus for conducting this research along with the hypothesis and goals are 
described. 
Chapter 2 will present the basics of power system protection from a time versus 
current analysis. There will be discussion of electrical current overloads and short 
circuits. The principles of electrical circuit breaker devices and fuses will be described. 
The different types of circuit breakers and their specifications will be discussed. 
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Chapter 3 presents an overview of electrical power system studies for 480 volt 
power systems. The process of a fault current calculation will be conceptually described 
to show the purpose of the study, modeling approach, and the software implementation. 
The utility source and its contribution into the system will be presented. The protective 
device coordination will be shown and the circuit breaker options will be discussed. The 
arc flash hazard analysis will be presented and shown how it applies to 480 volt systems. 
Chapter 4 will explore existing methods, techniques and devices aimed at 
mitigating the arc flash hazard exposure. These devices and techniques will be computer 
simulated to show the arc flash hazard before and after mitigation techniques are applied. 
The implemented equipment and techniques will show a decreased arc flash hazard 
incident energy and category. 
Chapter 5 will present the impact of arc flash hazard analysis on existing mission 
critical facilities. The existing electrical systems will be described along with objectives 
for the arc flash hazard analysis. The study will be performed by using computer 
simulation software and the results discussed. Methods for mitigating the arc flash hazard 
will be recommended and the system will be reevaluated by the software to show a 
decrease in the arc flash hazard. 
Chapter 6 will highlight design methods to help mitigate arc flash hazard 
exposure. Each case will show part of a 480 volt electrical system that is in compliance 
with the NEC and acceptable for an electrical building permit. The arc flash analysis will 
be performed on the system giving an incident energy level and hazard category. 
Recommendations to the system design will be made and a recalculation of the arc flash 
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hazard will be performed. The implemented design recommendations will show a 
decreased arc flash hazard incident energy and category. 
Chapter 7 will discuss the conclusions and future work. The results of 
implementing the recommended design techniques will be reviewed. Guidelines for 
future work will be discussed. 
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2. POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
In theory, the ideal electrical system receives power from the utility distribution 
system and performs exactly as the customer demands with no interruptions, voltage 
sags, or outages. This would allow for a system to be designed for amperage demand 
without having any concern about short term electrical transients. The practical use and 
maturation of an electrical system can involve many system abnormalities, such as 
overloads and short circuits. The response by the system under these transient conditions 
determines the functionality, viability, safety, and long term usefulness of the electrical 
distribution equipment. Power system protection is part of the design, planning and 
operation of an electrical system. Some of the main objectives of the protection system 
are to isolate short circuits and prevent equipment failure due to overload. This is 
accomplished by detecting electrical system abnormalities with the proper application of 
circuit breakers and fuses.  
 
2.1 Electrical System Abnormalities 
 
There are a multitude of electrical system abnormalities that can occur at any 
time. Some of these disturbances are voltage related and others are current based. The 
voltage related electrical system disturbances are classified as power quality issues and 
usually result in the alteration of the ideal sine wave. This is an important issue because 
newer generation load equipment, with microprocessor-based controls and power 
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electronic devices, is more sensitive to power quality variations than equipment used in 
the past [36]. The term power quality is an umbrella concept for a multitude of individual 
types of power system disturbances [36]. Some of these voltage based disturbances are 
interruptions, sags, swells, under-voltages, overvoltage, voltage imbalance, and 
harmonics. From a protection standpoint, these voltage disturbances are classified 
separately from current disturbances. 
Although voltage and current disturbances can be related through causation, 
current disturbances are primarily defined by the presence of an overcurrent.  The 
National Electrical Code defines an overcurrent as any current in excess of the rated 
current of equipment or the ampacity of a conductor. It may result from overload, short 
circuit, or ground fault [17]. Therefore, from a protection standpoint, the main objective 
is to avoid exposing the devices to overload conditions and isolate the equipment from 
faults and short circuits. 
 
2.2 Electrical System Overloads 
One of the main objectives for the electrical protection system is to prevent 
equipment failure caused by overload. Overload is defined by the National Electrical 
Code as the operation of equipment in excess of normal, full-load rating, or of a 
conductor in excess of rated ampacity that, when it persists for a sufficient length of time, 
would cause damage or dangerous overheating. A fault, such as a short circuit or ground 
fault, is not an overload [17].  Therefore, an overload occurs when the system is properly 
intact, but the use of the system is not per design. An example of overload is when two 
1500 watt hair dryers are attached to receptacles on the same 120 volt, 20 amp circuit. In 
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this case, the 3000 watts equates to 25 amps thus overloading the 20 amp conductor and 
circuit breaker. 
 
2.3 Electrical System Faults 
 
A fault occurs when the use of the system is per design, but the system is not 
properly intact. Some causes of faults can include weather, insulation failure, wildlife, 
vehicle crashes, and vandalism. When this unintentional electrical path is created, the 
system creates undesirable current paths that must be accounted for. The result is a 
collapse in voltage and an extreme inrush of current toward the fault location.  
During a fault, the current from all parts of the electrical system flow in the 
direction of the short circuit. This fault current level can range from 6.5kA amps at a 
13.2kV substation, to near 100kA at a 480 volt paralleled system. Fault levels are known 
to decrease with distance from the source due to system impedance [38]. It is important to 
protect the system from adverse effects that can occur from large magnitude currents.  
Power system faults may be categorized as one of four types: single line-to-ground, line-
to-line, double line-to-ground, and balanced three-phase [37]. Line-to-line faults are 
approximately 87% of three–phase fault currents. Line-to-ground faults can range from a 
few percent to possibly 125% of the three-phase value. In industrial systems, however, 
line-to-ground fault currents higher than the three-phase value are rare [49]. It is widely 
recognized that line-to-line faults in equipment or cables quickly escalate into three-phase 
faults [6]. In an industrial system, the three-phase fault condition is frequently the only 
one considered, since this type of fault generally results in maximum current [49]. All 
testing used in arc flash modeling was three-phase tested because three-phase arcs 
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produce the greatest possible arc-flash in ac equipment. Therefore, this project will focus 
only on three-phase balanced faults. 
It is convenient to analyze fault current as an asymmetrical waveform consisting 
of a symmetrical AC wave superimposed on a DC current [12]. The resulting waveform 
is shown to have an original peak value several magnitudes above the pre-fault conditions 
and is asymmetrically shaped from the x-axis.  The peak value occurring during the first 
half cycle of the fault is known as the Available Fault Current (AFC). This can be 
graphically represented as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
v(t) = voltage waveform 
iac(t) = original current waveform before fault occurs 
idc(t) = DC component of the fault 
i(t) = fault current waveform 
 
Figure 2.1: Fault Current Waveform Profile  
At the moment of initiation of a fault, the fault current wave i(t) is a combination 
of the original sine wave iac(t) and the DC component idc(t). The peak magnitude of i(t) 
can be multiples higher than the original current, depending on system conditions such as 
power factor. The magnitude decays as a result of the DC exponential, which is a 
resultant of the system reactance and resistance known as the X/R ratio. 
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2.4 Circuit Breakers 
 
Low voltage circuit protective devices include Molded Case Circuit Breakers, 
Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers, and insulated Case Circuit Breakers [42]. A circuit 
breaker is an electrical device designed to open an energized circuit under loaded 
conditions. All circuit breakers have the primary function of protecting the circuit 
conductors by detecting and interrupting over-currents [43]. The opening of an electrical 
circuit is in response to transient current conditions, such as an overload or fault in the 
system. Circuit breakers are rated by available interrupting capacity and rated continuous 
current. The interrupting capacity of a circuit breaker is the maximum current a circuit 
breaker is rated to safely interrupt at a specific voltage. This short-circuit current rating is 
normally expressed in rms symmetrical amperes and is specified by current magnitude 
only [39]. The continuous current rating is the amount of current a circuit breaker can 
carry until it reaches overload conditions and opens the circuit.  
Until the late 1960s the only circuit breaker trip units available were thermal-
magnetic molded case circuit breaker designs (MCCB) [39]. These circuit breakers were 
designed to be bolted on or snapped-into standard breaker panels. These devices are 
constructed in a solid case that is not capable of being disassembled for maintenance and 
repair. 
The magnetic trip element is often referred to as the instantaneous trip time and 
reacts quickly in response to high level short circuit currents. The thermal element is 
typically some type of bi-metal that expands due to the heat in a circuit caused by current 
at overload that is less than the magnetic pickup threshold.  The element then trips the 
MCCB after a time delay.  
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Circuit breaker trip curves are analyzed graphically in order to understand the 
time versus current application of the device. When displayed in this manner the plot is 
referred to as a time current curve (TCC). A typical time TCC for a 480 volt, 100 amp, 
non-adjustable thermal magnetic MCCB is displayed in Figure 2.2. Here it is shown that 
the thermal element is 100 amps at 1000 seconds and the instantaneous sensor is at less 
than 0.02 seconds for short circuit currents greater than 2500 amps. For a fault current 
level in the range of 900-1900 amps, the interrupting time is shown to be greater than one 
second. 
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Figure 2.2: TCC Curve for 480 volt, 100 amp MCCB 
 
Thermal magnetic MCCB’s are also available with an adjustable magnetic trip 
setting. This is very useful in situations where the available fault current is low and quick 
interruption is important. Figure 2.3 shows a TCC for this type of circuit breaker. This 
plot introduces the flexibility available for the instantaneous trip setting when using an 
adjustable breaker. 
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Figure 2.3: TCC Curve for 480volt, 100 amp MCCB with Low and High Settings 
 
The next available circuit breakers manufactured in the late 1960’s were the low-
voltage power circuit breakers (LVPSBs). These circuit breakers were designed to be 
rack mounted in switchgear, have larger frame sizes and higher current ratings than 
MCCBs. These devices are maintainable and can be disassembled for cleaning of 
contacts and replacing parts. 
The LVPCBs have thermal-magnetic trip units that respond to overloads in a 
similar manner as MCCBs: however, LVPCBs had a 30-cycle short time current rating 
consistent with ANSI standards [41]. This short time current rating allows for a second 
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breaker adjustment between the magnetic pickup and the long time sensor. These settings 
are commonly referred to as Long-Time (L), Short-Time (S) and Instantaneous (I), hence 
calling the breaker an LSI protective device. A TCC for a LVPCB is shown in Figure 2.4.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: TCC Curve Showing 480 volt, 100 ampere LVPCB 
 
The LVBCB has five adjustments in three time domains that allow for a circuit breaker 
curve to be custom fitted for the application. 
1. Long Time Pickup is set at the overload amperage. 
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2. Long Time Delay allows the pickup to be postponed. 
3. Short Time Pickup is the trip amperage after a delay time. 
4. Short Time Delay postpones the short time pickup to a designated time. 
5. Instantaneous pickup is the magnetic setting for immediate response. 
The TCC for two 100 ampere LVPCBs showing lowest and highest settings at all 
pickups and time delays are displayed in Figure 2.5. 
  
Figure 2.5: TCC Curve for 480 volt, 100 ampere LVPCB with LSI Settings 
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The Insulated Case Circuit Breaker (ICCB) was introduced in the mid-1970s. 
These devices were specially designed molded case circuit breakers that included some of 
the low-voltage power circuit breaker features [39]. These features included short time 
current duty cycles and a stored energy mechanism [43]. The ICCB had an instantaneous 
trip element that was capable of being set at a much higher trip level than the MCCB, 
which allowed some short time current ratings to be achieved.  
 
2.5 Circuit Breaker Testing 
In North America, low-voltage circuit breakers are designed and tested in 
accordance with ANSI/UL standard 1066, which refers to a series of applicable ANSI 
C37 standards [41,44,45,46]. Insulated case and molded case circuit breakers are 
designed and tested in accordance with UL standard 489 [40]. The UL standards 1066 
and 489 consist of a series of tests and construction for required ratings, trip units, 
overloads, endurance, short-time current, temperature rise, and dielectric withstand. Each 
standard is specific in the guidelines for an acceptable device. One of the particular 
testing parameters is the X/R ratio or dc offset decay. All low voltage protective devices 
are tested at pre-determined X/R ratios per the table below [17]. 
Table 2.1 Test X/R Ratios for Protective Devices 
DEVICE Test X/R ratio 
Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers 6.6 
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated less than 10k AIC 1.7 
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated between than 10k & 20k AIC 3.2 
Fuses, Insulated Case Circuit Breakers, Molded Case Circuit 
Breakers rated greater then 20k AIC 
4.9 
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Outside of the general construction and withstand requirements, the main 
application for this project is the adjustable setting of a circuit breaker that primarily 
differs in the short-time. The low-voltage power circuit breakers are manufactured to 
meet the testing requirements of UL 1066 [43]. This testing requirement is different than 
the UL 489 standard, mainly because the low-voltage power circuit breaker is required to 
carry fault current for two 0.5 second periods and the molded case device does not have a 
short time requirement.  
 
2.6 Fuses 
The term fuse is defined by ANSI/IEEE Std 100-2001 as “an overcurrent 
protective device with a circuit-opening fusible part that is heated and severed by the 
passage of overcurrent through it” [50]. Fuses were first introduced in the 1880s and were 
used for the protection of lighting installations. They were located adjacent to lamps and 
were to protect them from excess currents caused by source-voltage fluctuations [47]. 
Over the years, this device has improved its uses to include many different applications 
throughout the electrical system. The fuse has a wide range of protection applications 
from micro-electronic components up to high-voltage power system protection. 
The fuses used in 480 volt electrical systems are intended to protect the system 
from over-loads and fault currents. The basic operation of a fuse is a simple thermal 
process; the passage of excess currents through specifically designed fuse elements 
causes them to melt, and so isolate the faulty circuit [47]. The interrupting capability is 
altered by the fuse element and the filler in the fuse cartridge. 
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The fuse has no moving parts and, therefore, can be extremely fast acting upon 
the presence of high fault currents. The actuation of a fuse represents the end of its useful 
life and therefore the reliability and accuracy is maintained when new fuses are inserted 
into the circuit. The lack of moving parts leaves no ability to adjust the time domains of 
the fuse, which can be costly when trying to protect a system against fault currents. The 
TCC for a fuse is shown in Figure 2.6. The fuse curve shows the interrupting times for 
various levels of overcurrent. These interruptions can occur over a short range of time as 
shown by the minimum melt characteristic, which is the time the fuse begins to melt, and 
the total clearing characteristic, which is the complete interruption of the current. 
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Figure 2.6: TCC for 480 volt, 100 ampere Fuse 
 
The TCC for the 100 ampere fuse has similar inverse time characteristics as the 
circuit breakers. This particular device is shown to have 100 amperes of over-load 
protection beyond 100 seconds. For a short circuit of 2000 amperes, this device interrupts 
at approximately 0.05 seconds.  
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3. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM STUDIES 
The electrical system must be studied with the anticipation of transients such as 
overloads and faults. This is accomplished by implementing a fault current analysis, 
protective device time current coordination study, and an arc flash hazard analysis. 
This chapter is an overview of electrical power system studies for 480 volt power 
systems. The process of a fault current calculation will be conceptually described to show 
the purpose of the study and the software application. The utility source and its 
contribution to the system will be presented. The protective device coordination will be 
shown and the circuit breaker selections will be discussed. The arc flash hazard analysis 
will be presented and the resulting personal protective equipment requirements will be 
discussed. 
 
3.1 Fault Current Analysis 
 
The Fault Current Analysis or Short Circuit Study is an analysis of the electrical 
system under fault conditions. These faults can have many causes from adverse weather 
to aged insulation on conductors, to varmints chewing on the equipment. The result is a 
sudden electrical path from any phase to ground or any phase to another phase. In most 
cases these short circuits migrate to a three-phase fault and are studied from that 
perspective.  
26 
 
Analyzing fault current on a theoretical basis is accomplished by studying the 
response of the series R-L circuit shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1: Series RL Circuit 
 
 When the switch SW closes at time t=0, the circuit will react in the same manner 
as a balanced three-phase fault with zero impedance between the phases [12]. Writing 
Kirchoff’s Voltage Law for the circuit when t >0: 

  		
	  	√2 sin           (3.1) 
Solving this results in the fault current i(t): 
 
  √ sin	∝ 		  sin	  	/          (3.2) 
 i(t) =    iac(t)  -  idc(t)                                                     (3.3) 
 Z =  	 	 	!            (3.4) 
   = "#$ %& 	 	 "#$ 	'&                     (3.5) 
 (	  	 & 	 	 '%& 	 	 ')*& 	+,                     (3.6) 
To find i(t) at its greatest value we allow α =(θ-pi/2), then: 
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 The main purpose of the Short Circuit Study is to determine the available fault 
current (AFC) at locations throughout the system under fault conditions. The AFC is then 
compared to equipment withstand ratings and available interrupting capacity (AIC) of 
protective devices. Devices with a withstand rating do not interrupt fault current but must 
“ride through” a fault without damage imposed by the magnetic forces resulting from the 
large currents. Therefore, each panel-board must have a withstand rating greater than the 
AFC calculated at its bus. Each protective device must have an AIC greater than the AFC 
in order to be capable of interrupting the maximum fault current seen at its contacts. If a 
breaker or fuse is not rated to handle the maximum available fault current it might see, 
the device may not operate properly and its internal parts could fuse together or buckle 
under the destructive stresses of a fault condition, which can cause serious injury and/or 
property damage [11]. 
The AFC found at any point in an electrical system is a result of the fault 
contributions forced into the system and the impedances in their path to the fault location. 
The contributions toward the system consist of the utility, generators, and rotating 
machinery. The impedances throughout the system are supplied by conductors and 
transformers.  An example of a basic electrical system with a faulted bus can be displayed 
as one utility serving one main circuit breaker switchboard shown in the partial one-line 
diagram in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2: One-Line Diagram of Utility Serving Main SWBD 
 
In this system, the utility is the lone fault contribution with only the impedance of 
the conductors in the path to the faulted bus. The AFC at the Main SWBD is calculated 
using computer simulation software for speed and accuracy. This project will be 
conducted with multiple scenarios of electrical systems requiring calculations which will 
be aided by computer software. The actual process of calculating a fault current has been 
very well documented in the IEEE Standard 141 Red Book and IEEE Standard 242 Buff 
Book and will not be duplicated here [49,15]. However, this attenuation of fault current 
can be estimated using a point to point calculation method by the following equation 
[15].  
F= (1.732 x L x AFC)/(C x n x V)          (3.8) 
where 
L Length of conductor 
AFC Available fault current a beginning of run 
C  Constant representing conductor type 
n  number of conductor parallel runs  
UTILITY
Voltage 480 V
AFC 85635.0 Amps
CBL-MAIN
4   Sets of:
350 AWG/kcmil
Copper
Length 150.0 ft
PD-MAIN CB
AIC 100.0 kA
Rating 1200.0 A
MAIN SWBD
AFC 55.291 kA
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V Voltage line to line 
The AFC at the service entrance is a vital part of the calculation and is readily 
provided by the local electrical utility. Historically, this value is a very conservative large 
figure with the intent of evaluating the system during a worst case high fault current 
scenario. Therefore, the AFC is typically given as an infinite bus calculation that depends 
on the service transformer size and impedance. This results in the highest possible fault 
current that can be seen on the service transformer secondary terminals. The simple form 
of this calculation, based on infinite bus theory is indicated below [11]: 
1. Step One: Calculate the full load current at the secondary of the transformer. 
FLA (secondary) = 	56789.:;5		√7                     (3.9) 
2. Step Two: Calculate the Available Fault Current at the secondary of the 
transformer. 
 AFC (secondary) = <6	:;/=>.?@A	$BB%       (3.10) 
For a 13.2kV-480V, 1500kVA transformer with impedance (Z) = 5%, the resulting 
infinite bus calculation for AFC = 36,085 amps.  
The idea of the infinite bus value being a conservatively high AFC can be tested 
as follows. Given the primary side distribution voltage of the 1500kVA transformer at a 
typical 13.2kV we will simulate the secondary AFC with a range of primary side AFC 
values. It is shown in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1 that even for very high primary side AFC, 
the secondary AFC does not exceed the infinite bus value. Therefore, using the infinite 
bus method to calculate AFC is acceptable for evaluating AIC and withstand ratings of 
equipment. 
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Figure 3.3: Utility Contribution One-Lines 
 
 
Table 3.1 Simulation Results for 1500kVA Transformer with Z=5% 
Primary Side Contribution Transformer Secondary AFC 
5,000 amps 25,553 amps 
25,000 amps 30,010 amps 
65,000 amps 30,838 amps 
95,000 amps 31,006 amps 
UTILITY-1
Voltage 13200 V
AFC 5000.0 Amps
CBL-MAIN-1
4   Sets of:
350 AWG/kcmil
Copper
Length 150.0 ft
S
P XF-UTILITY-1
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA
Primary 13200 V
Secondary 480 V
XF-UTILITY-1 secondary
AFC 25.553 kA
PD-MAIN-1
AIC 100.0 kA
Rating 1200.0 A
MAIN SWBD-1
Withstand 100.0 kA
AFC 22.036 kA
UTILITY-2
Voltage 13200 V
AFC 25000.0 Amps
CBL-MAIN-2
4   Sets of:
350 AWG/kcmil
Copper
Length 150.0 ft
S
P XF-UTILITY-2
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA
Primary 13200 V
Secondary 480 V
XF-UTILITY-2 secondary
AFC 30.010 kA
PD-MAIN-2
AIC 100.0 kA
Rating 1200.0 A
MAIN SWBD-2
Withstand 100.0 kA
AFC 25.241 kA
UTILITY-3
Voltage 13200 V
AFC 65000.0 Amps
CBL-MAIN-3
4   Sets of:
350 AWG/kcmil
Copper
Length 150.0 ft
S
P XF-UTILITY-3
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA
Primary 13200 V
Secondary 480 V
XF-UTILITY-3 secondary
AFC 30.838 kA
PD-MAIN-3
AIC 100.0 kA
Rating 1200.0 A
MAIN SWBD-3
Withstand 100.0 kA
AFC 25.818 kA
UTILITY-4
Voltage 13200 V
AFC 95000.0 Amps
CBL-MAIN-4
4   Sets of:
350 AWG/kcmil
Copper
Length 150.0 ft
S
P XF-UTILITY-4
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA
Primary 13200 V
Secondary 480 V
XF-UTILITY-4 secondary
AFC 31.006 kA
PD-MAIN-4
AIC 100.0 kA
Rating 1200.0 A
MAIN SWBD-4
Withstand 100.0 kA
AFC 25.935 kA
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The peak value of the first cycle is a result of the DC exponential decay value. 
The rate of DC exponential decay occurs as a result of the system impedance properties 
when looking from the fault back to the short circuit contribution. The DC component of 
the current normally decays rapidly and reaches an insignificant value within 0.1 second 
in most power systems [12]. The conductor and transformer properties of resistance (R) 
and reactance (X) in calculation with the utility source system properties account for this 
value. This value is known as the X/R ratio and varies throughout the system depending 
on inherent properties. The protective devices must be measured against this value as 
well as the AFC. 
Right after a fault occurs the current is no longer a sine wave. The waveform can 
now be represented as the combination of a sine wave and a decaying exponential. Figure 
3.4 displays this waveform in a graphical setting. 
 
Figure 3.4: Fault Current Waveform 
 
At the moment of initiation of a fault the ac current wave, which is normally 
symmetrical about the zero axis, BX is offset by some value, creating a waveform which 
is symmetrical about another axis, CC’ [12]. The degree of the shifting is a result of the 
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circuit parameters and the location of the waveform when the short circuit was initiated. 
These system parameters also determine the rate of decay of the offset which is referred 
to as the DC current.  
There are some important measurements shown in Figure 3.4. The value from 
BA, Imc represents the asymmetrical peak value of the short circuit. This is termed 
asymmetrical because the waveform is no longer symmetrical about the time axis. This is 
the maximum instantaneous current in the major loop of the first cycle of short-circuit 
current. The rms symmetrical value of the short circuit current at any point in time, such 
as EE’, is the rms value of the ac portion of the current wave. The value of the rms ac is 
equal to the ac current divided by the square root of two, and is shown graphically by the 
distance from CC’ to DD’. The rms asymmetrical value of the short circuit current is the 
rms value of the combined ac and dc waves, and is calculated by the formula [12]: 
  -  DE6FG  -HI                    (3.11)  
These different parameters and nomenclature of the sine wave are important when 
equipment is manufactured to meet various standards and specifications. The 
specification of the standards can require performance and testing based on certain 
parameters of the short circuit current. 
The actual waveform of the asymmetrical fault current is hard to predict 
depending on exact moment during the voltage cycle the fault occurs. However, the 
largest asymmetrical fault current occurs when the fault happens at a point when the 
voltage is zero [51]. Then, the asymmetrical fault current depends only on the X/R Ratio 
and the magnitude of the symmetrical fault current. Figure 3.5 shows how the ratio of the 
peak asymmetrical current to RMS symmetrical current varies with the X/R Ratio [52].  
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Figure 3.5: Peak Asymmetrical Current versus X/R Ratio 
 
The devices manufactured for 480 volt systems have AIC and withstand ratings 
specified in RMS amperes. Furthermore, the AFC is calculated as an RMS value for 
consistency in equipment qualification and approval.  Even though low voltage devices 
do not have asymmetrical ratings, if the test X/R Ratio and symmetrical current rating are 
known, the maximum asymmetrical fault current rating can be achieved from Figure 3.5. 
The X/R value of the system is important because it determines the value of the 
fault current at 3-5 cycles after the fault which corresponds to the moment in time when 
the protective device will activate to isolate the fault. The higher the X/R ratio, the longer 
the DC component exists [16]. If the system X/R is greater than the protective device 
tested X/R, then further investigation is required to determine if the device is acceptable 
for use.  
When the system X/R ratio exceeds the protective device tested X/R the AIC of 
the protective device shall be de-rated per the following multiplication factor [51].  
         (3.12) 
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If the resulting de-rated AIC is greater than the AFC, then the device is properly 
rated for installation in the system at the specified location. 
All low voltage protective devices are tested at pre-determined X/R ratios per the 
table below [51]. 
 
Table 3.2 Test X/R Ratios for Protective Devices 
DEVICE Test X/R Ratio 
Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers 6.6 
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated less than 10k AIC 1.7 
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated between than 10k & 20k AIC 3.2 
Fuses, Insulated Case Circuit Breakers, Molded Case Circuit 
Breakers rated greater then 20k AIC 
4.9 
 
The short circuit study qualifies the equipment by measuring it against two 
parameters: 
1. The AIC rating of the equipment against the calculated system AFC. 
2. The X/R ratio at which the device was tested against the calculated X/R ratio 
of the system. 
If both of these requirements are met, then the equipment is suitable for 
installation in the system at the location of calculation. Figure 3.6 shows a partial one-line 
diagram with simulation results for AFC and X/R Ratio. The Figure shows that the circuit 
breaker PD-MAIN CB has an AIC greater than the system AFC and a test X/R Ratio 
greater than the system X/R Ration. The panel MAIN SWBD has a withstand rating 
greater than the system AFC and a test X/R Ratio greater than the system X/R ratio. 
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Therefore, both the circuit breaker and switchboard are sufficient for operating at this 
location within this electrical system. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Partial One-Line Diagram Showing Fault Current Values and X/R 
Ratios 
 
 
 
3.2 Protective Device Selective Coordination 
 
Selective coordination first became a requirement in the 1996 National Electrical 
Code (NEC) in Article 620, “Elevators, Dumbwaiters, Escalators, Moving Walks, 
Wheelchair Lifts, and Stairway Chair Lifts” [34]. Section 620.62 required that protective 
devices in each disconnect be selectively coordinated with the supply side overcurrent 
protective devices, where more than one driving machine’s disconnecting means is 
supplied by a single feeder. The NEC further expanded the requirement for selective 
coordination in 2005 as part of Article 700, “Emergency System”, and Article 701 for 
UTILITY
Voltage 480 V
AFC 85635.0 Amps
CBL-MAIN
4   Sets of:
350 AWG/kcmil
Copper
Length 150.0 ft
PD-MAIN CB
AIC 100.0 kA
Test X/R 4.899
MAIN SWBD
Withstand 200.0 kA
AFC 55.291 kA
Test X/R 6.600
System X/R Ratio 2.630
36 
 
“Legally Required Standby Systems” in Sections 700.27 and 701.18 entitled 
“Coordination” [33]. The 2005 NEC defines selective coordination as “Localization of an 
overcurrent condition to restrict outages to the circuit or equipment affected, 
accomplished by the choice of overcurrent protective devices and their ratings or 
settings” [17]. These additions to the code expanded the selective coordination 
requirement to ‘Essential electrical systems of Health Care Facilities”. The 2008 NEC  
added the requirement for selective coordination into the new Article 708, “Critical 
Operations Power Systems (COPS)” [35]. Section 708.54, “Coordination”, requires that 
COPS overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side 
overcurrent devices [35].  
Protective device selective coordination is the response of circuit breakers and 
fuses during a transient, with the intent of isolating the faulted part of the system from 
service. The goal is to minimize the damage to equipment and personnel in nearby 
locations, while maintaining electrical service in parallel branches. This is particularly 
important in mission critical systems that this project is based on. It is stated in the IEEE 
Buff Book that, “Coordination is a basic ingredient of a well-designed electrical 
distribution system and is mandatory in certain healthcare and continuous process 
industrial systems” [15]. This coordination must be done for all protective devices in a 
series from the sources to the loads. When circuit breakers are properly set and installed, 
a fault at any location has minimal effect on nearby panels and feeders. A one line 
diagram of an electrical system is shown in Figure 3.7. If a fault occurred at Motor-1 then 
proper selective coordination would exist if circuit breaker PD-Motor-1 opened before 
PD-Panel-C or any device further upstream. 
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Figure 3.7: One-Line Diagram of a Two Motor Electrical System 
 
The protective devices responsible for system selective coordination consist of 
fuses and circuit breakers.   These devices have a profile of current versus time that they 
will allow to pass before activating that is referred to as a time-current curve (TCC).  
Figure 3.8 shows a TCC for circuit breaker PD-Breaker and fuse PD-Fuse.  
 
 
UTILITY
CBL-MAIN
PD-MAIN
MDP
PD-PANEL-B
CBL-PNL-B
PANEL-B
PD-PANEL-C
CBL-PNL-C
PANEL-C
PD-MOTOR-1
CBL-MOTOR-1
MOTOR-1
PD-PANEL-D
CBL-PNL-D
PANEL-D
PD-PANEL-E
CBL-PNL-E
PANEL-E
PD-MOTOR-2
CBL-MOTOR-2
MOTOR-2
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Figure 3.8: Time Current Curves for a Circuit Breaker and a Fuse 
 
Since the reference voltage is 480 volt and the current is shown at times 10, a 6kA 
fault current would be cleared by this circuit breaker at 0.015 seconds and by this fuse at 
0.9 seconds.  
The TCCs for the system above with proper selective coordination is shown 
below in Figure 3.9. This plot shows all protective devices in the series from the Utility 
source to Motor-1.   
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Figure 3.9: Time Current Curves for a Selectively Coordinated System 
 
It is clear that the breaker curves do not touch or overlap each other and therefore 
proper selective coordination exists. The TCC for the system above is shown with a lack 
of selective coordination in Figure 3.10.  
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Figure 3.10: Time Current Curves with a Lack of Selective Coordination 
 
The overlap of breaker curves PD-Main and PD- Panel B is evidence that 
selective coordination does not exist. If a fault of 2800 amps were to occur on Panel B, 
then PD-Main would open before PD-Panel B. This would cause the feeder to Motor-2 to 
lose power and our goal of isolating the fault without disturbing nearby devices would 
not be achieved. 
Selective coordination is achieved by properly selecting and setting the protective 
devices. Actually, all electrical systems have a degree or some level of selective 
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coordination because the overcurrent protective devices closest to the source have higher 
ratings than the downstream devices [18]. This project focuses on coordination with 
circuit breakers because they can contain adjustable settings, where fuses do not. The 
adjustable features in a circuit breaker are divided by time segments. The Long Time 
(LT) is the setting of the breaker for overload conditions and is referred to as the 
amperage rating. This is generally in the time period beyond 60 seconds and reacts 
similarly to a thermal element. The Short Time (ST) is the setting for the breaker 
typically 0.5 seconds until the long time segment. This transitional period is important for 
sensing low level faults that may occur due to system impedances. The Instantaneous (I) 
element is the setting for the initial transient of a fault. This is often set very high to allow 
for motor and transformer inrush currents in the first few cycles of start-up but not higher 
than the available fault current.  
Figure 3.11 shows two thermal magnetic breakers with identical Long Time 
amperage ratings and an adjustable setting in the Instantaneous region only. PD-Panel-B 
is set at the lowest setting Instantaneous setting and PD-Panel-D is adjusted to the highest 
setting. Therefore, they have different curve locations in the Instantaneous regions, but 
overlap in the Long Time domain. 
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Figure 3.11: Time Current Curves for Thermal Magnetic Breakers 
 
Figure 3.12 shows two electronic breakers with adjustable settings in the Long 
Time, Short Time, and Instantaneous regions. When a circuit breaker is specified with 
this type of setting options, it is referred to as an LSI device. PD-Main is set at the proper 
overload rating for Long Time and is shown at the lowest settings for Short Time and 
Instantaneous. PD-M2 is also set at the proper overload rating for the Long Time but is 
adjusted to the highest settings for Short Time and Instantaneous. Therefore, they have 
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different curve locations in the Short Time and Instantaneous regions but overlap in the 
Long Time. This shows that an LSI breaker can be set to protect for Long Time overload 
and still have a multitude of curve locations in the Short Time and Instantaneous regions 
These curve locations can be adjusted for selective coordination with upstream and 
downstream protective devices. By specifying the proper breakers and adjusting the time 
domains, the goal of attaining selective coordination can usually be achieved. 
 
Figure 3.12: Time Current Curves for LSI Circuit Breakers 
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3.3 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis 
 
Performing a fault current analysis and a protective device coordination study 
allows us to proceed with the arc-flash hazard analysis. An arc-flash hazard analysis 
should be performed in association with or as a continuation of the short-circuit study and 
protective-device coordination study [6]. The results from the short-circuit study are used 
to determine the available fault current at electrical equipment locations and therefore be 
able to properly specify equipment withstand ratings and interrupting capabilities. The 
results from the protective-device coordination study give us information on the time the 
system takes to isolate overload or fault conditions. The results of the short-circuit and 
protective device evaluation are used in combination to give us the necessary information 
required to perform an arc-flash hazard analysis. The results of the arc-flash hazard 
analysis are used to identify the flash-protection boundary and the incident energy at 
assigned working distances throughout any position or level in the electrical system [6]. 
IEEE-1584 defines an empirical method to calculate the incident energy from the 
arc due to heat, which is responsible for the most common effect of an arc-flash: burns 
[6]. This procedure does not consider other adverse effects of the arc flash such as 
pressure waves, molten metal, shrapnel or flying debris. This method is applicable over a 
specified range of voltages, fault currents, and frequencies. The multiple steps taken 
included calculating an arcing current, using that result to calculate incident energy, then 
applying that information to determine an arc flash boundary. 
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The first step in the arc-flash analysis is to calculate the arcing current. Arcing 
current is a short circuit via ionized gas between one live part and the ground or another 
live part [19]. Due to the arc resistance, the arc current is not the same as the available 
fault current. Arcing current is always lower than the bolted fault current [20, 21].  
From the IEEE-1584 empirical derived model for a system under 1000V and 
having an available fault current between 700A – 106kA, the arcing current can be 
calculated as follows [6]: 
lg Ia= J  	0.662 lg -P* 0.0966	  0.000526	S  0.5588		Ulg VP*W  0.00304	S	VZVP*	  (3.13) 
where 
 
 lg is the log10 
 
 Ia is arcing current (kA) 
 
 K is -0.153 for open configurations and 
  is -0.097 for box configurations 
 
 Ibf is bolted fault current for three-phase faults (kA) 
 
 V is system voltage (kV) 
 
 G is the gap between conductors, (mm) 
 
 
This project analyzed the effects of the arc-flash exposure for qualified 
technicians working on electrical equipment in a mission critical facility. Therefore, the 
K value is -0.097 to represent the arc occurring inside an electrical panel, switchboard, or 
motor control center. The system voltage V, for this project is 480 except when a step-
down transformer is inserted to achieve a 208 volt feeder. The value for G is the gap 
spacing between the conductors or bus bars, which is dependent on equipment design. 
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This research studies low voltage switchgear which equates to a value of 32 from the 
IEEE-1584 table below. 
 
Table 3.3 Classes of Equipment and Typical Bus Gaps 
Classes of Equipment Typical Bus Gaps (mm) 
15kV switchgear 152 
5kV switchgear 104 
Low-voltage switchgear 32 
Low-voltage MCCs and panelboards 25 
Cable 13 
Other Not required 
 
This reduces the arcing current equation (3.13) to: 
Ia  = 10B.B7\	]	B.^77_`aEbc           (3.14) 
The incident energy is a value that represents the amount of thermal energy that a 
person is exposed to at a given distance. Incident energy is measured in Joules per square 
centimeter (J/cm2) and is defined as a watt second [6]. The calculations in this research 
are performed in the English system and, therefore, reports in the conversion 
nomenclature of calories per square centimeter (cal/cm2).  The incident energy, 
normalized for an arc duration of 0.2 seconds and a distance of 24” can be calculated 
given the arcing current above and using the following formula [6].   
The Incident Energy normalized is calculated as follows: 
 
lg En = K1 + K2 + 1.081 lg Ia + 0.0011 G        (3.15) 
where 
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 En is normalized incident energy (J/cm2) 
 
 K1 is -0.792 for open box configurations (no enclosure) and 
  is -0.555 for box configurations (enclosed equipment) 
 
 K2 is 0 for ungrounded and high-resistance grounded systems and 
  is -0.113 for grounded systems 
 
 Ia is arcing current from above 
 
 G is the gap between conductors (mm) 
 
The constants K1 and K2 are dependent upon the physical enclosure of the circuit 
breaker. Since circuit breakers are mounted in a panel-board or switchgear it is in a box 
configuration. This will give a K1 value of -0.555. The systems this project will analyze 
are grounded and therefore a K2 value of -0.113 is appropriate. 
This reduces the normalized incident energy equation (3.15) to: 
 En  = 10(-0.633 + 1.081logIa)         (3.16) 
For a different arc duration and/or distance from the arc, the normalized incident 
energy can be converted into the actual incident energy as follows [6]: 
E = CfEn  B.(d$B
e
fe )            (3.17) 
where 
 
 E is incident energy (cal/cm^2) 
 
 Cf is 1.0for voltages above 1kV and 
  is 1.5 for voltages at or below 1kV 
 
 En is normalized incident energy 
 t is arcing duration in seconds 
 
 D is the distance from possible arc point to the person (mm) 
 
 x is the distance exponent  
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This equation can be reduced by verifying system parameters. This project 
analyzes systems at 480 volts and therefore Cf is 1.5. The value for the distance exponent 
x, is furnished by the IEEE 1584 table below. 
Table 3.4 Distance x Factors  
System Voltage Equipment Type Distance x Factor 
208-1kV Open Air 2.000 
208-1kV Switchgear 1.473 
208-1kV MCC and Panels 1.641 
208-1kV Cable 2.000 
 
The value of D represents the distance from the exposed energized electrical 
conductor to the maintenance personnel working on the equipment. This value is 
standardized by IEEE 1584 depending on the class of the energized electrical equipment 
[6]. 
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Table 3.5 Classes of Equipment and Typical Working Distances 
Classes of Equipment Typical working distance (inches) D 
15kV switchgear 36 
5 kV switchgear 36 
Low-voltage switchgear 24 
Low-voltage MCC’s and panel-boards 18 
Cable 18 
Other TBD 
 
Using x=1.473 and D = 18”, reduces the incident energy equation (3.16) to: 
 E  = 2.295 En(t/0.2)           (3.18) 
Equations 3.14, 3.16, and 3.18 may now be combined into one equation which expresses 
the incident energy E as a function on Ibf and t, as follows [22]: 
 E = 2.295 {10(-0.670 + 0.901 log Ibf)} (t/0.2)        (3.19) 
Note that (3.19) is only valid for the assumptions made above, which are made for 
a power circuit breaker in an electrical system analyzed by this project (i.e., a solidly 
grounded 480 volt system, a circuit breaker mounted in a low-voltage switchgear, and at 
a working distance of 18”). 
The arc-flash hazard analysis provides important information that helps establish 
a safety barrier for workers when exposed to energized equipment. The incident energy 
level that will cause a just curable burn or a second degree burn is 1.2cal/cm2 [4]. If a 
butane lighter is held 1 cm away from a person’s finger for 1 second and the finger is in 
the blue flame, a square centimeter area of the finger will be exposed to about 1.2cal/cm2 
[6]. The entire premise of safety and arc flash is based on a curable or second degree burn 
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and, therefore, the incident energy level of 1.2cal/cm2 is an important value. The distance 
away from an exposed energized conductor that is calculated at 1.2cal/cm2 is known as 
the arc-flash boundary. This can be calculated by rearranging equation (3.17) and solving 
for distance at an incident energy of 1.2cal/cm2. 
 Db = {4.184 Cf En ( B.)(610
x/Eb)}1/x                            (3.20) 
where 
 Db is the boundary from the arcing point or the flash protection boundary 
 Cf is 1.5 for voltages at or below 1Kv 
 En is incident energy normalized 
 Eb is incident energy at boundary distance 
 t is time in seconds 
 x is the distance exponent from Table 3.3 
After comparing equations 3.19 and 3.20, it is clear that the determining factors 
for the incident energy level are the arcing current that results from the available fault 
current and the time that the arc exposure exists. These factors are controlled by the 
system in which the circuit breaker is installed and the interrupting characteristics of the 
circuit breaker. Figure 3.13 shows a circuit breaker time current curve with the arcing 
current crossing it.  
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Figure 3.13: Circuit Breaker TCC Interrupting Arcing Current 
 
Here it is shown that an arcing current of approximately 10.9kA is interrupted by 
the circuit breaker PD-PANEL-B at a time of 0.0175 seconds. This entire process is 
recalculated at a fault current level of 85% less than the reported AFC. This allows for a 
worse-case scenario if the fault current is lower than anticipated. This arcing current is 
simultaneously plotted against the protective device curve and the slowest interrupt time 
is used in calculating the incident energy. Figure 3.14 shows both arcing currents plotted 
against PD-Panel-B. 
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Figure 3.14: Circuit Breaker TCC Interrupting Arcing Currents 
 
This information can be used in the equations above to calculate the incident 
energy for Panel-B. The computer simulation output results are shown in the partial one-
line diagram in Figure 3.15. 
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Figure 3.15: Partial One-Line Showing Panel-B Incident Energy 
 
With this information of an incident energy level of 0.6 cal/cm2, the qualified 
technician can select clothing and personal protective equipment rated for arc-flash 
safety. The clothing and equipment selected must always have an arc flash rating greater 
than the incident energy at the electrical device to be maintained. Since the incident 
energy level can have a multitude of values ranging from 0.1cal/cm2 up to over 
40cal/cm2, the amount of different clothing devices could be enormous. Therefore, the 
concept of grouping the incident energy levels into categories arose.  
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3.4 Arc Flash Hazard Risk Categories 
 
While incident energy prediction was being researched, there were also studies 
being conducted on how to protect workers in the event of an arc-flash. In 1997 and 
1098, two papers on the testing of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Arc-Flash 
Exposure were published [8,9]. This project tested the flammability of clothing when 
exposed to arc flashes of differing incident energy magnitudes. Ultimately the paper 
proposed protective clothing classes based on ranges of incident energy exposure which 
correlated to a fire rated clothing system and description. This project also included the 
performance of safety glasses, face shields, and work gloves when exposed to an arc-
flash. This research provided the ground work for a standardized system focused on 
worker safety in the event of an incident. 
In parallel with the developments of the IEEE Standard, the NFPA 70E Standard 
for Electrical Safety in the Workplace was created [10]. A portion of this document 
covers the need for informing employees of the electrical arc flash hazard they are 
exposed to when working on energized equipment. NFPA 70E divides incident energy 
levels into hazard/risk categories ranging from 0-4. Each category is given a clothing 
description and a required minimum arc rating of personal protective equipment. These 
categories are very similar to those suggested by Neal and Bingham. [8,9]. 
The Arc Flash Hazard Analysis gives us an incident energy level at a specified 
working distance from the source of the arc. This enables us to select Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) that is rated above the incident energy. Although the concept of 
wearing PPE that is suited for the task is simple, the different incident energy levels can 
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be numerous. Therefore, the implementation of hazard risk categories was instituted into 
the PPE selection process. 
There are hazard risk category levels 0,1,2,3, and 4 which correlate to maximum 
incident energy levels (cal/cm2) of 1.2, 4, 8, 25, 40. This allows for an electrical device to 
be labeled per category and the selection of PPE can be matched the same way. 
Table 3.6 Hazard Risk Categories and PPE Characteristics 
Hazard Risk Category 
(HRC) 
Typical Protective 
Clothing Systems 
Required Minimum PPE 
Arc Rating 
(cal/cm2) 
0 Non-melting, flammable 
materials(natural or treated 
materials with at least 4.5 
oz/yd2) 
N/A (1.2) 
1 FR pants and FR shirt, or 
FR coverall 
4 
2 Cotton Underwear, plus FR 
shirt and FR pants  
8 
3 Cotton Underwear, plus FR 
shirt and FR pants and FR 
coverall 
25 
4 Cotton Underwear, plus FR 
shirt and FR pants and 
multi-layer flash suit  
40 
 
The partial one-line diagram for Panel-B can now include a hazard risk category 
also known as a PPE Category as shown below in Figure 3.16. 
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Figure 3.16: Partial One-Line Showing Panel-B Incident Energy and Hazard Risk 
Category 
 
Per Table 3.6, the highest hazard risk category is level 4, with a maximum 
incident energy of 40cal/cm2. While PPE is certainly available in ratings well above 
40cal/cm2, working near exposed energized electrical equipment above 40cal/cm2 is 
discouraged [27]. Annex D of NFPA 70E notes that, “greater than normal emphasis 
should be placed on de-energizing the equipment” (Annex D.8 FPN) at such high 
incident energy levels. 
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4. EXISTING ARC FLASH HAZARD MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
This chapter will present existing products, techniques and devices aimed at 
mitigating the arc flash hazard exposure. These products and techniques will be computer 
simulated with before and after simulations of the electrical system. The implemented 
equipment and techniques will show a decreased arc flash hazard incident energy and 
category. 
 
4.1 Changing Work Methods and Procedures 
The approach of changing work methods for mitigating arc flash hazards focuses 
on the existing calculations and changes of the environment to decrease arc flash 
exposure. Incident energy reduction approaches by changing working methods include 
changing work procedures, modifying existing settings, and increasing work distances 
[24].  
There are multiple work procedures that can be implemented to reduce arc flash 
exposure. The best work practice to avoid exposure is to work in the de-energized state 
[25]. NFPA 70E devotes an entire section to de-energizing or the process of achieving an 
electrically safe work condition. However, this is typically not possible in mission critical 
facilities where life support equipment is dependent on a constant power supply. 
Energized work shall be permitted where the employer can demonstrate that de-
energizing introduces additional or increased hazards such as the interruption of life 
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support equipment, deactivation of emergency alarms, and shutdown of hazardous 
location ventilating equipment [10].  
There are workmanship and technical training procedures that can be instituted to 
decrease the arc-flash exposure. A specific example is by changing locations when taking 
measurements with a power quality meter. Historically, measurements have been 
performed by direct connection of the voltage and current probes to the primary circuit, 
where incident energy can be relatively high [24]. By taking the measurements at the 
potential transformers and current transformers, the arc-flash exposure can be reduced.   
 
4.2 Temporarily Modifying Existing Protective Device Settings 
One of the most common and easiest arc flash mitigation techniques is to 
temporarily modify the existing settings of the first upstream protective device. This can 
be accomplished by lowering the instantaneous setting of the circuit breaker that is 
protecting the equipment to be worked on. An example of this is shown by the partial 
one-line diagrams in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: Incident Energy Before and After Temporary Setting of Breaker CB-
Main 
 
Here, it is shown that by lowering the instantaneous setting of circuit breaker CB-
MAIN from 15 (24000A) to 10 (16000A) the incident energy decreases from 
121.8cal/cm2 to 4.9cal/cm2 and the PPE Category decreases from Dangerous to HRC 2. 
Care must be taken when implementing this solution, as protective device coordination 
may be affected when reducing the clearing time of protective devices [24]. Furthermore, 
there must not be any devices downstream that could require sudden in-rush of current 
that could trip the lowered instantaneous setting. The starting of a motor or energizing a 
transformer could draw up to six times the operating amps for that device and therefore 
cause a circuit breaker trip in the instantaneous time domain. 
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4.3 Increasing the Working Distance 
The calculations from IEEE-1584 for incident energy involve several unknowns 
that must be collected in order to achieve an accurate result. However, the most critical 
variables are the distance from the arc and the time to interrupt the fault. Since the 
incident energy is proportional to the square of the distance (in open air), increasing the 
working distance will significantly reduce the incident energy [23]. Care must be taken 
when implementing this solution because increasing the distance could hinder a person’s 
ability to work on the equipment [24].  Working distance can easily be increased by using 
remote racking devices, remote operating equipment, and extension tools. Where the 
equipment design permits, it is very beneficial to carry out all switching operations 
remotely, away from the switch gear [25]. Racking and switching of a low voltage power 
circuit breaker is probably the highest exposure that will occur in industrial facilities [27]. 
One way to reduce the hazard is to lengthen the tool used to rack the breaker, or use 
remote racking/switching equipment that is available from manufacturers or other 
suppliers [27]. The partial one-line diagrams in Figure 4.2 show the effectiveness of 
increasing the working distance. 
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Figure 4.2: Incident Energy Before and After Increasing Working Distance 
 
Here it is shown that by increasing the working distance from 18 inches to 10 feet 
through the use of a remote racking device, the incident energy decreases from 
67.6cal/cm2 to 3cal/cm2 and the PPE Category decreases from Dangerous to HRC 1.  
 
4.4 Arc Flash Resistant Switchgear 
 The selection and specification of electrical equipment can be accomplished with 
the inclusion of arc-flash hazard properties. However, the design and manufacturing 
specification should be carefully reviewed before purchasing equipment. Low voltage 
switchgear and control gear assemblies are tested for short time and short circuit 
withstand according to IEEE C.37.20 [29]. Many new designs are available from 
manufacturers to reduce the arc flash hazard exposure [25]. Arc flash resistant switchgear 
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is a new manufacturing procedure for the mitigation of incident energy exposure. Arc-
resistant switchgear is tested to withstand an internal arc, and ensure that the person 
operating the switch or working on the equipment is not exposed to the hazard [28]. This 
is typically accomplished by ventilating the energy out of the top of the switchgear or 
some direction away from the worker. Although this is an excellent idea for personal 
protection when the equipment is closed, the worker is generally engaged with the 
devices when the enclosure is open. 
 
4.5 Optical Light Sensor Technology 
 Electrical system protection is designed to interrupt the flow of electricity in the 
event of an overcurrent or fault condition. When an arc flash occurs the arcing time is a 
critical factor in limiting the damage and risk of personal injury resulting from an arc 
flash [26]. Therefore, the faster the relay senses the arc-fault, the lesser the incident 
energy will be and the safety of the worker is increased. Optical sensor technology 
detects the light from the arc-flash and initiates a shutdown.  
When an arc flash occurs there is a tremendous release of radiant energy that 
consists of audible, thermal, light, and other energy properties. The light intensity of the 
arc flash is comprised of different wavelengths than visible light.  Visible light consists of 
the light spectrum ranging from 400nm to 700nm wavelengths but arc flash tests have 
shown to produce wavelengths in the range of 200nm to 600nm. Consequently, optical 
arc flash relays are designed to operate in the lower end of the visible spectrum and 
slightly lower including ultraviolet light [30].  
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An optical arc flash detection relay system requires a light sensor and a current 
measuring device. The light sensor detects the sudden change in the light spectrum 
wavelength and the current measuring device detects the change in instantaneous over-
current. Tripping only occurs if both light and fault current are detected [30]. These 
relays are equipped with solid state technology for additional speed and they utilize peak 
to peak measurements to avoid the delay associated with root-mean-square calculations. 
The total operating time is typically less than 2.5ms for the relay [31]. After the relay 
sends a signal to the disconnecting device, it is another 5 cycles or 84ms for circuit 
breaker opening time. This equates to a total arc flash detection and interrupting time of 
approximately 0.09 seconds. 
This type of system is dedicated to arc-flash protection and can be viewed as a 
stand-alone system. When in use, this avoids the process of coordinating with upstream 
and downstream protective devices. However, if more dedicated arc flash protection was 
added to the system, then time delays for trip time should be selectively coordinated. 
The optical sensing device most often used is a fiber optic cable that can be up to 
200 feet long. The cable is constructed of plastic fiber with a glass core and is routed 
throughout all switchgear compartments where an arc flash could occur. The routing for 
the fiber optic cable in two-high construction switchgear is shown in Figure 4.3.  
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Figure 4.3: Typical Fiber Optic Routing in Switchgear 
 
The fiber is shown routed in a continuous loop to allow for the option of 
continuous monitoring by the arc detection relay. This can be accomplished by sending a 
test pulse through the system at periodic intervals. If the test pulse is not received as 
programmed, then an alarm can be activated to alert maintenance personnel of an 
equipment failure. 
Unlike communication fibers, this optical sensor has no cladding to prevent 
ambient light from entering the fiber [23].  This is vital to the operation because the 
system depends on external light to alert of an arc flash. The lack of opaque fiber 
cladding allows some of the light to enter through the exposed cylindrical exterior 
surface, where it propagates back to the electronics. When arc flash occurs, the system 
will detect the light and the relay will send a trip signal to the circuit breaker. The light 
sensor system can be operated in automatic or manual mode. In automatic mode, the 
system continually adjusts its pickup to normal slow changing background light levels 
and therefore any false trips associated with opening an equipment enclosure door can be 
avoided. Manual light intensity level settings may be more appropriate where some 
normal low-level arcing might take place such as in older air-magnetic switchgear [23] 
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To supervise the instantaneous overcurrent change during a fault, the relay has 
inputs for a signal from conventional 5 amp current transformers. These are typically 
connected to the current transformers located on the source side of the main breaker and 
are used to drive instantaneous phase and ground over-current elements [26]. These over-
current elements behave as fault detectors and signal the relay when a rapid change in 
current is detected. Fault detector supervision is selectable but recommended by the 
manufacturer for most applications [23]. When both the optical and fault detection 
systems indicate an arc-flash, the relay will send a trip signal to the circuit breaker. A 
block diagram is shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Arc Detection Relay Block Diagram 
 
The block diagram shows two high speed solid state relays and one conventional 
normally-open contact for tripping. The operating times of the solid state and contact 
tripping times are illustrated below in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Arc Detection Relay Operating Times 
 
 
The major benefit of using this style of arc flash detection relay is the ability to 
limit incident energy whether the available fault current is relatively high or low. IEEE 
1584 states that the worst case incident energy level may not occur at the bolted fault 
current point. With the standard protection of time overcurrent and instantaneous 
protection, low level fault currents can easily result in higher incident energy levels 
because the clearing time is so much longer [32]. The increased clearing time from a 
lower amperage fault current can offset the higher amperage from a larger fault current 
and produce an incident energy that is more hazardous. Once the arcing current exceeds 
the instantaneous setting, incident energy levels drop dramatically [23]. Figure 4.6 below 
illustrates this. 
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Figure 4.6: Incident Energy Levels With and Without Arc Flash Relay 
 
The arc flash relay is shown to provide instantaneous tripping across all 
magnitudes of fault current. Because there is no coordination requirement, clearing time 
is essentially reduced to the operating time of the back-up breaker [23]. This shows the 
benefit in reducing the clearing time of the arc flash. 
A typical single loop example for the fiber optic sensor is shown below in Figure 
4-7. In this application the single optical fiber covers four circuit breaker feeder cubicles. 
When the fault detector pickup threshold is exceeded and an optical arc flash is detected, 
the arc detection relay will send a trip signal to both the high-side and low-side circuit 
breakers. 
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Figure 4.7: Single Fiber Loop Layout 
 
 
4.6 Allowing a Lack of Circuit Breaker Selectivity 
The goal of protective device coordination is to isolate the faulted section of the 
electrical system and to not interrupt nearby or parallel feeders. This process is 
accomplished by the setting of protective devices as shown in Chapter 2. However, when 
protecting the system for arc flash, the isolation of the faulted section must happen as 
quickly as possible in order to avoid the damage to electrical equipment and maintenance 
personnel. When a protective device system has been selectively coordinated with the 
goal of isolating faults, the optimal arc flash protection might not be in place.  
Allowing the electrical system to operate with a lack of selective coordination can 
sometimes decrease the arcing current interruption time and therefore decrease the 
incident energy. Although the 2008 NEC Article 708 calls for selective coordination in 
all “Critical Operations Power Systems (COPS), not all electrical systems fall under this 
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categorization [35]. An example is of a manufacturing facility that produces aluminum 
siding where the system is not COPS, but the company management has decided not to 
de-energize for certain types of electrical system maintenance.  
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5. IMPACT OF ARC FLASH ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter presents the impact of arc flash hazard analysis on existing facilities 
and the implementation of mitigation techniques with the intent of lowering arc flash 
hazards. The facilities analyzed are from a database of over one-hundred electrical 
system studies completed during the last 12 years. The existing electrical systems will be 
described along with owner’s objectives and goals for the arc flash hazard analysis. The 
study will be performed with the assistance of computer software and the results analyzed 
and discussed. Methods for mitigating areas of high arc flash hazard will be 
recommended and then the system will be reevaluated by the computer software. 
 
5.1 Free Standing Ambulatory Surgery Center 
 This section of the project analyzes a power distribution system located in a free 
standing ambulatory surgery center located in Pinellas County that was built in 1999. The 
facility contains approximately 7500 square feet of offices and surgical suites. Per the 
State of Florida Statutes and the Agency for Healthcare Administration, a fault current 
study and protective device coordination analysis was required for this facility before a 
Certificate of Occupancy could be issued. Years after opening, an arc flash hazard 
analysis was directed by ownership with the intent to comply with OSHA and NFPA. 
The company goal was to achieve a hazard risk category 3 or below at all electrical 
breaker panels in the system. 
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The electrical service entrance is 120/208 volts, 600 amps, 3-phase, 4-wire, 
grounded Y. The distribution design consists of a main distribution panel (MDP) 
specified at 800 amp main lug only with 5 feeder breakers serving as the system main 
disconnects.  The system design and installation is acceptable per the National Electrical 
Code and all applicable building codes. The partial one-line diagram in Figure 5.1 shows 
this feeder system. 
 
Figure 5.1: One-Line Diagram for Surgery Center 
 
By observing the output results of the computer simulation in Figure 5.1, it is 
possible to verify the equipment ratings by comparing the system fault current and X/R 
ratio with the equipment withstand or AIC and tested X/R ratio. This comparison is 
shown in the equipment evaluation Table 5.1 and each device is shown as a pass or fail 
based on this criteria.  For this electrical system, all devices pass the equipment 
evaluation for fault current analysis. 
  
UTILITY
MDP
BoltedFault 23.857 kA
Withstand 65.0 kA
System X/R 0.006
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 8.010 kA
ProtDev PD-UTILITY
Incident Energy 47.42 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category Dangerous!
PD-N1
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PNL N1
BoltedFault 13.982 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.008
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.504 kA
ProtDev PD-N1
Incident Energy 0.29 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-N2
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PNL N2
BoltedFault 13.982 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.008
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.504 kA
ProtDev PD-N2
Incident Energy 0.29 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-N3
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PNL N3
BoltedFault 13.982 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.008
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.504 kA
ProtDev PD-N3
Incident Energy 0.29 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-CH-1
225.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
CH-1
BoltedFault 14.819 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.008
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.734 kA
ProtDev PD-CH-1
Incident Energy 0.3 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-E1
250.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 65.0 kA
PNL-E1
BoltedFault 14.819 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.008
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.734 kA
ProtDev PD-ATS
Incident Energy 0.73 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
S
P XF-UTIL
575.0 kVA
Primary 13200 V
Secondary 208 V
PD-UTILITY
30.0 A
Test X/R 15.000
AIC 12.5 kA
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Table 5.1 Equipment Evaluation Table for Surgery Center 
Device AFC/Bolted 
Fault 
Withstand/AIC System X/R Device 
Tested X/R 
Result 
MDP 23.8kA 65kA 0.006 4.8 Pass 
PD-N1,2,3 13.9kA 25kA 0.006 4.8 Pass 
PD-E1 14.8kA 25kA 0.006 4.8 Pass 
PD-CH-1 14.8kA 25kA 0.006 4.8 Pass 
PNL-N1,2,3 13.9kA 35kA 0.008 4.8 Pass 
PNL-E1 14.8kA 35kA 0.008 4.8 Pass 
PNL-CH-1 14.8kA 35kA 0.008 4.8 Pass 
 
After all devices are evaluated per fault current analysis, the system must be 
analyzed for protective device coordination. Due to the design of this electrical system, 
the protective device coordination can quickly be tested. Since all feeder breakers are the 
same size and type, one typical TCC curve showing the selective coordination with the 
utility fuse is all that is necessary. 
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Figure 5.2: TCC Curve for Surgery Center 
 
The time current curves show that there is no overlap of the protective device 
curves, hence this system is selectively coordinated.  
The results of the arc flash hazard analysis are given on the one line diagram. This 
shows incident energy levels for PNL-N-1,2,3 at 0.29cal/cm2,  PNL-E1 at 0.73cal/cm2, 
and PNL-CH-1 at 0.3cal/cm2 which are all hazard risk category 0. A typical time current 
curve with arcing current and hazard risk categories for these panels is shown below in 
Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Time Current Curve for Arcing Current at PNL-N1 
 
The arc flash hazard analysis for the main distribution panel MDP shows a much 
more serious situation. The results of the simulation report an incident energy of 
47.42cal/cm2, which results in a hazard risk category of Dangerous. This is a result of the 
MDP’s primary protective device being the utility fuse PD-Utility. The TCC with arcing 
current for the MDP is shown below. 
 
Category 4
Category 3
Category 2
Category 1
Category 0
0.5 1 10 100 1K 10K
0.01
0.10
1
10
100
1000
CURRENT IN AMPERES
5.3.tcc   Ref. Voltage: 208V   Current in Amps x 1   
TIM
E
 IN
 SECO
NDS
PD-N1
Arcing Current at PNL-N1
Arcing Current Interupted at CAT 0
75 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Time Current Curve for Arcing Current at MDP 
 
The time current curve for PD-Utility is shown to clear the arcing current at 
approximately 8 seconds. This results in a hazard risk category of Dangerous. 
 The next step is to investigate arc flash hazard mitigation techniques for this 
electrical system. There is one panel that has an incident energy resulting in an 
unacceptable hazard risk category which is the MDP. The inherent system design and 
installation does not offer any options to adjust protective device settings with the intent 
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of protecting the MDP with a quicker interrupt during an arc flash. This electrical system 
is a candidate for add-on equipment.  
A possible solution for this surgery center is to add a main protective device 
ahead of the MDP. Installing a 600 amp fuse ahead of the MDP, results in the software 
analysis shown in the one line diagram below in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: One-Line Diagram for Surgery Center with Added Main Fuse
UTILITY
MDP
BoltedFault 12.591 kA
Withstand 65.0 kA
System X/R 0.008
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 4.347 kA
ProtDev PD-Main
Incident Energy 16.89 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 3
PD-N1
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PNL N1
BoltedFault 9.208 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.010
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 4.105 kA
ProtDev PD-N1
Incident Energy 0.22 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-N2
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PNL N2
BoltedFault 9.208 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.010
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 4.105 kA
ProtDev PD-N2
Incident Energy 0.21 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-N3
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PNL N3
BoltedFault 9.208 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.010
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 4.105 kA
ProtDev PD-N3
Incident Energy 0.21 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-CH-1
225.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
CH-1
BoltedFault 9.544 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.010
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 4.210 kA
ProtDev PD-CH-1
Incident Energy 0.22 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-E1
250.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 65.0 kA
PNL-E1
BoltedFault 9.544 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.010
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 4.210 kA
ProtDev PD-E1
Incident Energy 0.52 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
S
P XF-UTIL
575.0 kVA
Primary 13200 V
Secondary 208 V
PD-UTILITY
30.0 A
Test X/R 15.000
AIC 12.5 kA
PD-Main
600.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 200.0 kA
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The one line diagram now shows the incident energy at MDP at 16.89cal/cm2, 
which results in a hazard risk category 3. The TCC for this added fuse PD-MAIN is 
shown below. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: TCC for Arcing Current at MDP with Added Fuse 
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The TCC shows the new main fuse PD-MAIN interrupting the arcing current at 
approximately 0.4 seconds thus resulting in a hazard risk category 3. 
In theory, this is a viable solution. However, implementation this could create a 
number of serious issues for the facility, including: 
1. The electrical service will have to be interrupted for an extended period of 
time. 
2. The existing electrical service conduit and conductors will have to be dug-up 
and replaced. 
3.  The expense for this could be large and will have to be budgeted. 
There are no other arc-flash mitigation options for the MDP panel of this 
electrical system. As the system currently operates, they will need to have the power 
company take them out of service when they maintain the MDP panel. 
 
5.2 Heart Catheterization Center  
 This section of the project analyzes a power distribution system located in a free 
standing ambulatory heart catheterization center located in Putnam County, FL that was 
built in 2001. The facility contains approximately 8100 square feet of offices, exam 
rooms, and heart catheterization suites. Per the State of Florida Statutes and the Agency 
for Healthcare Administration, a fault current study and protective device coordination 
analysis was required for this facility before a Certificate of Occupancy could be issued. 
Years after opening, an arc flash hazard analysis was directed by ownership with the 
intent to comply with OSHA and NFPA. The owner’s goal was to achieve a hazard risk 
category 1 or below for all buses and electrical breaker panels in the system. 
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The electrical service entrance is 277/480 volts, 800 amps, 3-phase, 4-wire, 
grounded Y. The distribution design consists of a main distribution panel (MDP) 
specified at 800 amp main circuit breaker with 4 feeder breakers distributing power to 
distribution panels and transformers.  The system design and installation is acceptable per 
the National Electrical Code and all applicable building codes. The partial one-line 
diagram in Figure 5.7 shows this electrical system. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: One-Line Diagram for Heart Catheterization Lab 
  
UTILITY
CBL-UTIL
PD-MDPmcb
800.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 50.0 kA
MDP
BoltedFault 7.791 kA
Withstand 65.0 kA
System X/R 0.035
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.298 kA
ProtDev PD-MDPmcb
Incident Energy 0.67 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-H1
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL H1
BoltedFault 7.516 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.036
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.138 kA
ProtDev PD-H1
Incident Energy 0.27 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-CATH-1
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL CATH-1
BoltedFault 7.516 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.036
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.138 kA
ProtDev PD-CATH-1
Incident Energy 0.27 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-XF-LDP
225.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
S
P XF-LDP
150.0 kVA
Primary 480 V
Secondary 208 V
PANEL LDP
BoltedFault 6.002 kA
Withstand 100.0 kA
System X/R 0.019
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 3.039 kA
ProtDev PD-XF-LDP
Incident Energy 18.32 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 3
PD-PNL-L1
150.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL L1
BoltedFault 4.348 kA
Withstand 10.0 kA
System X/R 0.023
TestX/R 1.732
ArcingFault 2.424 kA
ProtDev PD-PNL-L1
Incident Energy 0.12 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-PNL-L2
150.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL L2
BoltedFault 4.348 kA
Withstand 10.0 kA
System X/R 0.023
TestX/R 1.732
ArcingFault 2.424 kA
ProtDev PD-PNL-L2
Incident Energy 0.12 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-CATH-2
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL CATH-2
BoltedFault 7.516 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.036
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.138 kA
ProtDev PD-CATH-2
Incident Energy 0.27 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
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From observing the output results of the computer simulation in Figure 5.7, it is 
possible to verify the equipment ratings by comparing the system fault current and X/R 
ratio with the equipment withstand or AIC and tested X/R ratio. This comparison is 
shown in the equipment evaluation Table 5.2 and each device is shown as a pass or fail 
based on this criteria.  For this electrical system all devices pass the equipment evaluation 
for fault current analysis. 
Table 5.2 Equipment Evaluation Table for Heart Catheterization Lab 
Device AFC/Bolte
d Fault 
Withstand/AI
C 
System 
X/R 
Device 
Tested X/R 
Result 
PD-MDPmcb 7.8kA 50kA 0.035 4.8 Pass 
PD-H1,Cath1&2 7.8kA 25kA 0.035 4.8 Pass 
PD-XF-LDP 7.8kA 25kA 0.035 4.8 Pass 
MDP 7.8kA 65kA 0.035 4.8 Pass 
PNL-H1, Cath1&2 7.5kA 35kA 0.036 4.8 Pass 
PNL-LDP 6.0kA 100kA 0.019 4.8 Pass 
PNL-L1&L2 4.3kA 10kA 0.024 1.7 Pass 
 
Next, the system must be analyzed for protective device coordination. Due to the 
design of this electrical system, the protective device coordination can quickly be tested. 
Following the largest feeder breaker in each leg allows for one TCC diagram to show 
selective coordination. 
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Figure 5.8: TCC Curve for Heart Catheterization Lab 
 
The time current curve for the heart catheterization lab shows that there is no 
overlap of the protective devices, hence this system is selectively coordinated.  
The results of the arc flash hazard analysis are given on the one line diagram. This 
shows incident energy levels for MDP at 0.67cal/cm2, Panels-H1, Cath1&2 at 
0.27cal/cm2, and Panels-L1&2 at 0.12cal/cm2 which are all hazard risk category 0. A 
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typical time current curve with arcing current and hazard risk categories for these panels 
is shown below in Figure 5.9. 
  
Figure 5.9: Time Current Curve for Arcing Current at Panel H1 
 
The arc flash hazard analysis for the Panel LDP shows a much more hazardous 
situation. The results of the simulation report an incident energy of 18.32cal/cm2 which 
results in a hazard risk Category 3. This is a result of the transformer XF-LDP primary 
protective device being the thermal magnetic breaker PD-XF-LDP. The TCC with arcing 
current for the Panel LDP is shown below. 
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Figure 5.10: Time Current Curve for Arcing Current at Panel LDP 
 
Figure 5.10 shows the time current curve for PD-XF-LDP clearing the arcing 
current at approximately 8 seconds. However, due to research results and the guidelines 
of IEEE 1584, the analysis will limit the arcing duration at 2 seconds and calculate the 
incident energy then. This results in a hazard risk of Category 3. 
The next step is to investigate arc flash hazard mitigation techniques for this 
electrical system. There is one panel that has an incident energy resulting in an 
unacceptable hazard risk category which is Panel LDP. The protection device for this 
Category 4
Category 3
Category 2
Category 1
Category 0
0.5 1 10 100 1K 10K
0.01
0.10
1
10
100
1000
CURRENT IN AMPERES
5.10.tcc   Ref. Voltage: 480V   Current in Amps x 10   
TIM
E
 IN
 SECO
N
DS
PD-XF-LDP
Arcing current at Panel LDP
85 
 
panel is a thermal magnetic breaker and the instantaneous adjustment does not offer 
enough flexibility to interrupt the arcing current at a shorter duration.  
A possible solution for this heart catheterization lab is to replace the thermal 
magnetic breaker with a more flexible LSI style device. By installing a 225 amp LSI 
adjustable breaker to protect the transformer XF-LDP, the system gets the results shown 
in the software analysis below. 
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Figure 5.11: One-Line Diagram for Surgery Center with Added Main Breaker 
 
The one line diagram in Figure 5.11 now shows the incident energy at Panel LDP 
at 0.37cal/cm2, which results in a hazard risk category 0. The TCC for this changed PD-
XFV-LDP is shown below in Figure 5.12. The arcing current is now interrupted at 
approximately 0.085 seconds thus lowering the arc flash hazard. 
 
 
 
UTILITY
CBL-UTIL
PD-MDPmcb
800.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 50.0 kA
MDP
BoltedFault 7.791 kA
Withstand 65.0 kA
System X/R 0.035
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.298 kA
ProtDev PD-MDPmcb
Incident Energy 1 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-H1
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL H1
BoltedFault 7.516 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.036
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.138 kA
ProtDev PD-H1
Incident Energy 0.27 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-CATH-1
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL CATH-1
BoltedFault 7.516 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.036
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.138 kA
ProtDev PD-CATH-1
Incident Energy 0.27 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-XF-LDP
250.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 65.0 kA
S
P XF-LDP
150.0 kVA
Primary 480 V
Secondary 208 V
PANEL LDP
BoltedFault 6.002 kA
Withstand 100.0 kA
System X/R 0.019
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 3.039 kA
ProtDev PD-XF-LDP
Incident Energy 0.37 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-PNL-L1
150.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL L1
BoltedFault 4.348 kA
Withstand 10.0 kA
System X/R 0.023
TestX/R 1.732
ArcingFault 2.424 kA
ProtDev PD-PNL-L1
Incident Energy 0.12 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-PNL-L2
150.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL L2
BoltedFault 4.348 kA
Withstand 10.0 kA
System X/R 0.023
TestX/R 1.732
ArcingFault 2.424 kA
ProtDev PD-PNL-L2
Incident Energy 0.12 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
PD-CATH-2
200.0 A
Test X/R 4.899
AIC 25.0 kA
PANEL CATH-2
BoltedFault 7.516 kA
Withstand 35.0 kA
System X/R 0.036
TestX/R 4.899
ArcingFault 5.138 kA
ProtDev PD-CATH-2
Incident Energy 0.27 Cal/cm^2
PPE Category 0
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Figure 5.12: TCC for Arcing Current at Panel LDP with LSI Breaker 
 
It is important to check with the series breakers for verification that selective 
coordination still exists with the new LSI circuit breaker. This is accomplished by 
plotting the upstream and downstream breakers with the new settings of PD-XF-LP. 
These circuit breakers are shown to be selectively coordinated in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13: TCC for Heart Catheterization Lab after Breaker Change 
 
5.3 Metal Container Manufacturer  
This section of the project analyzes a power distribution system located in a metal 
container manufacturing plant located in Hillsborough County that was originally 
constructed in the 1970s. The facility is approximately 2500 square feet of offices and 
175,000 square feet of manufacturing. An arc flash hazard analysis was directed by upper 
management with the intent to comply with OSHA and NFPA 70E. The corporate goal 
was to achieve a hazard risk category 1 or below at all points in the system. 
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The electrical service entrance is 13.2kV at 2500 amps with step down 
transformers to 277/480 volts, 3-phase, grounded Y. The distribution design consists of 
an entrance switchboard with four feeder breakers serving the manufacturing sections of 
the factory. Each quadrant consists of an LSI circuit breaker serving a continuous bus 
duct with fused bus-taps serving the subsequent bus duct. The partial one-line diagram in 
Figure 5.14 shows this feeder system. 
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Figure 5.14: Partial One-Line Diagram for Bus Duct Feeder  
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From observing the output results of the computer simulation in Figure 5.14, it is 
possible to verify the equipment ratings by comparing the system fault current and X/R 
ratio with the equipment withstand or AIC and tested X/R ratio. This comparison is 
shown in the equipment evaluation Table 5.3 and each device is shown as a pass or fail 
based on this criteria.  For this portion of this electrical system all devices are shown to 
be acceptable based on fault current analysis. 
Table 5.3 Equipment Evaluation Table for Bus Duct Feeder 
Device AFC Withstand/AIC System 
X/R 
Device 
Tested X/R 
Result 
Bus-B 20.7kA 35kA 0.013 5.0 Pass 
Bus-B1 17.9kA 22kA 0.015 4.9 Pass 
PD-Bus-B1 17.9kA 300kA 0.015 5.0 Pass 
 
After all devices are evaluated per fault current analysis, the system must be 
analyzed for protective device coordination. The time current curves for PD-Bus-B and 
PD-Bus-B1 are shown below in Figure 5.15.  
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Figure 5.15: TCC PD-Bus-B and PD-Bus-B1  
 
The time current curves show that although there is some overlap of the protective 
device curves, selective coordination with these devices does exist because the fuse PD-
Bus-B1 will melt before the tripping of circuit breaker PD-Bus-B. 
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The results of the arc flash hazard analysis are given on the partial one line 
diagram. This shows incident energy levels for Bus-B and Bus-B1 at 49.7cal/cm2 and 
19.3cal/cm2 respectively, resulting in hazard risk category Dangerous and 3. The time 
current curves with arcing current and hazard risk categories for Bus-B and Bus-B1 are 
shown below in Figures 5.16 and 5.17. 
 
Figure 5.16: Time Current Curve for Arcing Current at Bus-B 
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The time current curve for PD-Bus-B relay is shown to clear the arcing current at 
well beyond 10 seconds. This results in a hazard risk category of Dangerous. 
 
Figure 5.17: Time Current Curve for Arcing Current at Bus-B1 
 
The time current curve for PD-Bus-B1 is shown to clear the arcing current at 
approximately 0.45 seconds. This results in a hazard risk category of 3. 
The next step is to investigate arc flash hazard mitigation techniques for this 
section of the electrical system. We have two protective devices in the fuse PD-Bus1 and 
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the adjustable LSI breaker PD-Bus B relay. This is good news for Bus B because the 
settings of the PD-Bus B relay can be adjusted downward to interrupt the arcing current 
quicker. At the same time our protection options for Bus B1 are limited because there are 
no possible adjustments for the fuse interrupting the arcing current there. However, Bus 
B1 can be better protected by adjusting the PD-Bus B relay below the fuse melting point. 
This is developing into a classic case of allowing for dis-coordination. The partial one-
line diagram if Figure 5.18 shows the results of this implementation. 
  
 
Figure 5.18: Partial One-Line Diagram after Implementation of Dis-Coordinated 
Settings  
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The results of the arc flash hazard analysis after adjusting PD-Bus B are given on 
the partial one line diagram in Figure 5.18. This shows incident energy levels for Bus-B 
and Bus-B1 decreased to 2.1cal/cm2 and 1.8cal/cm2 respectively, resulting in hazard risk 
category 1 for both buses. The time current curves with arcing current and hazard risk 
categories for Bus-B and Bus-B1 are shown below in Figures 5.19 and 5.20. 
 
Figure 5.19: TCC for Arcing Current at Bus-B after Breaker Adjustment 
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The time current curve for PD-Bus-B in Figure 5.19 is shown to clear the arcing 
current at Bus B in approximately 0.05 seconds. This results in a hazard risk category 
rating of 1. 
  
Figure 5.20: TCC for Arcing Current at Bus-B1 after Breaker Adjustment 
 
The time current curve for PD-Bus-B in Figure 5.20 is shown to clear the arcing 
current at Bus B1 in approximately 0.05 seconds. This results in an arc flash hazard risk 
category of 1. 
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This chapter has taken actual electrical power systems and analyzed them for 
short circuit, protective device coordination, and arc flash hazard. The results have shown 
that some existing electrical systems have been designed and constructed with inherent 
properties that often create a high arc flash hazard. The arc flash hazards in these existing 
systems were mitigated using after-market products and techniques that can be costly and 
sometimes leave the system to operate in a less than ideal condition.  It is important to 
investigate ways to mitigate the arc flash hazard during the design phase of the project 
because additional expense and dangerous conditions can be avoided. 
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6. IMPLEMENTATION OF DESIGN METHODS FOR ARC FLASH 
MITIGATION 
 
The previous chapters of this dissertation have focused on background 
information important to understanding the arc flash hazard. Those chapters also detailed 
the methods for analyzing an electrical system and the process that must occur in order to 
calculate the arc flash hazard exposure of a technician performing work on energized 
electrical devices. The research completed in this dissertation focused on the 
recommended design practices that should be implemented with the goal of mitigating 
the arc flash hazard before an electrical system is constructed. 
This chapter highlights techniques developed by the researcher to be implemented 
during the design phase of electrical distribution systems that will help mitigate arc flash 
hazard exposure. These techniques were extracted from a database of over three hundred 
case studies. The case study projects were all designed by licensed professional engineers 
over the last 21 years. The analysis of the case studies has led to these techniques. For 
each case study presented a 480 volt electrical system that is in compliance with the NEC 
and acceptable for an electrical building permit is the starting point. The arc flash 
analysis is then performed on the system giving an incident energy level and hazard 
category. Recommendations for arc flash hazard mitigation to the design of the system 
are made and a recalculation of the arc flash hazard performed.  The implemented design 
recommendations will show a decreased arc flash hazard incident energy and hazard risk 
category. 
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The following sections show that NEC acceptable design strategies can be altered 
to include the safety concerns of NFPA 70E and therefore will minimize the arc flash 
hazard exposure. This is specifically evident in the following areas: 
1. When applying the National Electric Code, Article 230, Part VI, always 
specify a single main circuit breaker for building shutdown. 
2. At the electrical service entrance the design shall specify enclosed low voltage 
power circuit breakers in place of fused disconnects. 
3. Specify adjustable low voltage power circuit Breakers for protection of step-
down transformers rated above 125kVA. 
4. Step-Down Transformers larger than 125kVA shall be replaced with a design 
having two smaller transformers. 
 
6.1 When Applying the National Electric Code, Article 230, Part VI, Always 
Specify a Single Main Circuit Breaker for Building Shutdown 
 
There are several important factors that need to be included in the decisions made 
during the design of the electrical service entrance and main distribution panel. The 
service entrance must meet all NEC requirements for system shutdown and electrical 
protection. The main distribution panel must be properly sized to carry the facility 
demand load to avoid an overcurrent situation. The main distribution panel and the 
protective devices installed inside it must be braced to withstand the available fault 
current imposed during a short circuit. Furthermore, the main breakers and feeder 
breakers in the main distribution panel must coordinate with each other and downstream 
devices to ensure proper isolation of short circuits within the system. In mission critical 
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facilities the main distribution panel must be properly maintained and therefore the arc 
flash hazard at this location is important.     
The National Electrical Code, Article 230, Part VI addresses building main shut 
down and disconnect requirements. This part of the code states that an electrical service 
may be shut down by a maximum of six grouped devices. These devices can be circuit 
breakers, fused switches, or disconnect switches. This is often accomplished by having a 
main panel with no main circuit breaker and a maximum of six feeder breakers. A one-
line diagram of this scenario is shown in Figure 6.1. This installation is acceptable by the 
NEC and is a typical installation found in 480 volt electrical distribution systems. 
 
Figure 6.1: Partial One-Line Diagram with 6-Hand Rule in Use 
 
The simulation in Figure 6.1 shows a utility serving a main distribution panel 
MDP. This MDP is constructed with no main circuit breaker and five feeder breakers 
denoted PD-MAIN#1-5. In this state the five feeder breakers are acceptable for use as the 
building disconnecting means per NEC, 230, Part VI. 
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The simulation shows the fault current of the MDP calculated at 21.13kA, which 
can be considered a moderate level. The arcing current is shown to be 7.35kA and is a 
reasonable level for this type of facility. However, the arc flash hazard for this type of 
installation is very high because the only protective device for the main panel (MDP) is 
the utility fuse on the primary side of the service transformer. Figure 6.1 shows an 
incident energy of 47.64 cal/cm2 at the MDP, which corresponds to a PPE Category of 
Dangerous.  
Studying the service entrance from a time current analysis gives another 
perspective. The TCC is plotted in Figure 6.2 and this shows the utility fuse (PD-UTIL) 
interrupting the arcing current beyond 10 seconds thus justifying the high exposure. The 
hazard risk category lines are superimposed on the TCC allowing us to see the 
justification for this scenario having a hazard risk category of Dangerous. 
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Figure 6.2: TCC Showing Arc Flash Exposure for Six-Hand Rule 
 
This is an unacceptable scenario in a mission critical facility because the incident 
energy is above 40 cal/cm2 and, therefore, a hazard risk category of Dangerous. 
According to NFPA-70E: energized electrical work is not permitted on this device so 
periodic maintenance or facility changes that include this panel cannot be performed 
without an electrical shutdown. The feasibility of an electrical shutdown is often not 
possible in a mission critical facility, thus the system must be designed and constructed 
differently. 
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The result of this research is a recommendation that when applying the National 
Electric Code, Article 230, Part VI, always specify a single main circuit breaker for 
building shutdown and do not use numerous feeder devices as main disconnects. 
Furthermore, this single main breaker should be in a separate enclosed device located 
away from the MDP. This will isolate the protection device of the main panel from the 
technician working on the panel and therefore lowering the arc flash exposure. If the 
main breaker is located within the MDP, then there is a dangerous arc flash exposure at 
the entrance of the service conductors.  
The recommendation for minimizing this exposure is to eliminate the 
implementation of numerous main devices. This can be accomplished by installing a low 
voltage power circuit breaker ahead of the MDP. This low voltage power circuit breaker 
should be specified with adjustable settings in the long time, short time, and 
instantaneous time domains. Adjusting the main breaker settings to mitigate the arc flash 
will create a safer working environment at the MDP and will allow the facility to be 
flexible if the fault contribution from the distribution were to change due to generation 
plant or substation alterations.   
After the implementation of this recommended circuit breaker installation, the 
case study was re-simulated. The one-line diagram showing the computer simulation 
results is shown in Figure 6.3. The new 1200 amp main circuit breaker is now located 
ahead of the MDP and is referred to PD-MDP NEW.  
At each panel the available fault current, arcing fault, incident energy, and PPE 
Category are given. The available fault current and arcing current at the MDP remain at 
approximately the same level. However, with the new main breaker inserted ahead of the 
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MDP, the result is an incident energy down from 47.6 cal/cm2 and Category Dangerous 
to 2.38 cal/cm2 and a Category 1. This is a significant change that would allow 
technicians to perform energized maintenance on this device.   
  
 
Figure 6.3: Partial One-Line Diagram with Main Breaker Installed 
 
 The results of this change can be further validated by analyzing the results in the 
time versus current domain. The TCC is plotted in Figure 6.4 and it shows the new main 
device PD-NEW MAIN plotted with the arcing current of 7.35kA. The plot displays the 
interrupting of the arcing current by PD-NEW MAIN at 0.10 seconds which is in the 
range of a Category 1 exposure. This allows maintenance to be performed on the MDP 
while it is energized and the facility remains in normal operation. 
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Figure 6.4: TCC with Main Breaker Installed 
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6.2 At the Electrical Service Entrance the Design Shall Specify Low Voltage 
Power Circuit Breakers Instead of Fused Disconnect Switches 
 
The National Electrical Code, Article 230, Part IV addresses building main shut 
down and proper disconnecting methods. Every facility must have a readily accessible 
means of disconnecting the electrical service. This is often accomplished by installing a 
main fused disconnect switch at the service entrance typically near the electrical meter. A 
one-line diagram of this scenario is shown in Figure 6.5.  
 
  
Figure 6.5: One-Line Diagram Showing Main Fused Disconnect 
 
This electrical system consists of a utility 2500kVA transformer serving a main 
disconnect fused at 3200 amps. The fuse is protecting a main distribution panel MDP 
which contains three feeder breakers and a fuse. The arc flash hazard for this type of 
installation can be high or low depending on the available fault current and the resulting 
arcing current. Figure 6.5 shows an incident energy at the MDP of 136 cal/cm2 resulting 
in a PPE Category of Dangerous. This is unacceptable for a mission critical facility 
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because the electrical system must remain energized and NFPA 70E does not allow 
energized work where an arc flash hazard is this extreme. 
Analyzing this in the time versus current domain justifies the results of the 
simulation. Figure 6.6 plots the 3000 amp fuse and the 19.4kA arcing current at the MDP. 
The fuse curve shows the interruption of the 19.4kA arcing current beyond 2 seconds and 
resulting in a hazard risk category Dangerous.  
  
Figure 6.6: TCC for Main Fused Disconnect 
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The technique developed in this research for minimizing the exposure is to 
specify a low voltage power circuit breaker with LSI adjustments instead of the fused 
disconnect switch. This will allow for shaping the protection curve based on the available 
fault current and arcing current. The one-line diagram showing this system is shown in 
Figure 6.7. The simulation of the revised circuit shows the arcing current remaining at 
19.4kA which is expected. However, the incident energy was decreased to 4.8 cal/cm2, 
resulting in a PPE Category 2.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Partial One-Line Diagram for Service Entrance with LSI Main Breaker 
 
Analyzing this in the time versus current domain validates the results of the 
simulation. Figure 6.8 plots the new LSI circuit breaker PD-MCB and the arcing current 
at the MDP. The breaker curve shows instantaneous interruption of the arcing current at 
0.07 seconds and therefore a quicker extinguish of the arc than with the fuse. This is 
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shown to occur within the hazard risk category 2 range. The simulations result of incident 
energy at 4.8 cal/cm2 is consistent with this finding. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: TCC for Service Entrance with LSI Main Breaker 
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6.3 Specify Adjustable Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers for Protection of 
Step-Down Transformers Rated above 125kVA  
 
There are several important factors included in the decisions made during the 
design of the electrical feeders served from the main distribution panel. The feeder 
conductors and circuit breakers must be sized to carry the calculated amount of current 
load to avoid an overcurrent situation. The feeder breakers must have proper available 
interrupting capacity ratings to withstand the fault currents that they must interrupt during 
a short circuit. The feeder breakers must be properly coordinated with the upstream and 
downstream protective devices. In mission critical facilities, the transformers and 
subpanels served by these feeders must be properly maintained and therefore the arc flash 
hazards at these locations are important.     
The service voltage in the facilities being studied is 480 volt, three-phase. 
However, there are numerous loads in a building that require 120/208 volt service, such 
as air conditioning equipment, service receptacles, computers, and lighting. This creates a 
need for the 480 volt service voltage to be transformed down to 120/208 volts. This is 
accomplished by creating a lower voltage leg in the system by inserting a large step-down 
transformer fed from the main panel to serve 120/208 volt loads downstream. A one-line 
diagram of this scenario with a thermal magnetic breaker (PD-XF-1) protecting a 
225kVA transformer feeding Panel L1 is shown in Figure 6.9.  
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Figure 6.9: Partial One-Line Diagram Showing Arc Flash Increase across 225kVA  
 
 The challenge with this scenario is with the decrease in fault current and arcing 
current that occurs across the transformer. This is expected due to the amount of 
impedance that the transformer represents in this circuit. The simulation in Figure 6.9 
shows the available fault current on the primary side of the 225kVA transformer at 
32.17kA and the available fault current at the secondary side at 10.38kA.  
Following the equations of IEEE 1584, the fault current has been shown to 
directly relate to the arcing current. Therefore, the arcing current at the secondary side of 
the transformer will also decrease considerably when compared to the primary side. The 
simulation in Figure 6.9 shows the arcing current on the primary side of the 225kVA 
transformer at 17.79kA and the arcing current at the secondary side at 3.79kA. The 
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decreased arcing current at the secondary will delay the time for the primary side breaker 
to interrupt an arc flash.  
The amount of time needed to interrupt the arc is directly related to the arc flash 
incident energy. This leads to an increase in incident energy from 0.6 cal/cm2 on the 
primary side of the transformer to 23.3cal/cm2 on the secondary side and a PPE category 
change from 1 to 4. This is a significant increase in the protection equipment required to 
work on this energized equipment. 
Analyzing this in the time versus current domain further validates this outcome. 
Figure 6.10 displays the TCC plot for the primary side of the transformer. The circuit 
breaker PD-XF-1 is plotted along with the primary side arcing current of 17.79kA. It is 
shown that the circuit breaker interrupts the arc at approximately 0.015 seconds which is 
in the range of hazard category line 1. The calculations in the simulation calculate this at 
1.55cal/cm2.  
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Figure 6.10: TCC Showing Thermal-Mag Breaker and Arcing Current at Primary 
of XF-1 
 
Figure 6.11 displays the TCC plot for the secondary side of the transformer. The 
circuit breaker PD-XF-1 is plotted along with the secondary side arcing current of 
4.46kA. The plot shows the decrease in fault current and therefore lowering of the arcing 
current across the transformer XF-1. This moves the arcing current level inside the 
instantaneous adjustable range of the thermal magnetic breaker, thus causing the long 
exposure time and high arc flash hazard. It is shown that the circuit breaker interrupts the 
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arc at approximately 50 seconds, which is above all hazard category lines and therefore 
considered dangerous for energized work. However, IEEE 1584 limits the maximum 
exposure time for calculating incident energy at 2 seconds and therefore the calculations 
in the simulation report this at 27.78kA cal/cm2 which corresponds to a hazard risk 
category 4.  
  
Figure 6.11: TCC Showing Thermal-Mag Breaker and Arcing Current at 
Secondary of XF-1 
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Category 4 personal protective equipment is available, but it is preferred to lower 
the exposure to a category 0 or 1 whenever possible and limit the potential exposure of 
the technicians. It is the conclusion of this analysis to protect these transformers with a 
low voltage power circuit breaker containing adjustable LSI adjustments in lieu of the 
standard thermal magnetic circuit breaker. Although the thermal magnetic breaker has 
instantaneous adjustment, this change in arcing current is shown to potentially attenuate 
into the short time region and delay the interrupt time. The low voltage power circuit 
breakers with LSI are adjustable in the short time and therefore can mitigate this arc flash 
exposure by interrupting the arc much quicker. The simulation one-line diagram showing 
this improved system is shown in Figure 6.12.  
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Figure 6.12: Partial One-Line Diagram Showing Arc Flash Mitigation across 
225kVA  
 
The simulation for the new system shows that the available fault currents on the 
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of 0.55 cal/cm2 on the primary side of the transformer and 2.85 cal/cm2 on the secondary 
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side. The primary side of the transformer is decreased to a hazard risk category 0 and the 
secondary side is reduced to a category 1.  
Analyzing this in the time versus current domain validates the results of the 
simulation. Figure 6.13 plots the new LSI circuit breaker PD-XF-1 and the arcing current 
on the primary side of the transformer. The breaker curve shows instantaneous 
interruption of the arcing current and therefore a quicker extinguish of the arc than the 
thermal magnetic breaker. This is shown to occur in the hazard risk category 0 range. The 
simulation result of incident energy at 0.055 cal/cm2 is consistent with this finding. 
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Figure 6.13: TCC Showing LSI Breaker and Arcing Current at Primary of XF-1 
 
Figure 6.14 shows the decrease in fault current and therefore lowering of the 
arcing current across the transformer XF-1. This moves the arcing current level inside the 
adjustable short-time range of the LSI breaker. Setting the short time inside the arcing 
current allows for short exposure time and low arc flash hazard. Circuit breaker PD-XF-1 
is shown to interrupt the arcing current at approximately 0.21 seconds and therefore low 
incident energy is calculated and a PPE Category 1 is calculated on the secondary of the 
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transformer. This is consistent with the simulation incident energy calculation resulting in 
2.85cal/cm2. 
 
Figure 6.14: TCC Showing LSI Breaker and Arcing Current at Secondary of XF-1 
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6.4 Step-Down Transformers Larger than 125kVA Shall Be Replaced with a 
Design Having Two Smaller Transformers  
 
The service voltage in the facility we are studying is 480/277 volt, three-phase. 
However, there are numerous loads in a building that require 120 volt service such as 
basic receptacles, computers, and lighting. This requires the 480 volt service voltage to be 
transformed down to 120 volts. This is typically accomplished by creating a lower 
voltage leg in the system by inserting a large step-down transformer in the system and 
feeding all 120/208 volt loads downstream. When the 120/208 volt load is significant, the 
step down transformer can be 150kVA and larger. A one-line diagram of this scenario 
with a 225kVA transformer feeding Panel L1 is shown in Figure 6.15.  
 
Figure 6.15: Partial One-Line Diagram with 225kVA Step-Down Transformer 
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The computer simulation of the circuit described in Figure 6.15 shows an incident 
energy of 25 cal/cm2 and a PPE Category 4.  
The TCC for this configuration is plotted in Figure 6.16 and this shows the circuit 
breaker (PD-XF-1) interrupting the arcing current beyond 2 seconds thus confirming the 
high exposure. 
 
Figure 6.16: TCC Showing Arc Flash Hazard at Panel L1 
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The recommendation for minimizing this exposure is to replace one large step 
down transformer with multiple smaller transformers that are less than 125kVA. The 
increased impedance of the smaller conductors and transformers brings down the fault 
current and arcing current. The smaller rated circuit breaker has the ability to stay below 
this arcing value. This also allows for application of NFPA 70E option of reporting 
Category 0 for any bus served by a transformer less than 125kVA and 240 volts. The 
one-line diagram showing this system is shown in Figure 6.17. The 225kVA transformer 
feeding Panel L1 is replaced by two 112.5kVA transformers feeding Panels L1 and L2. 
The result is an incident energy of 0.2 cal/cm2 and a Category 0.  
 
Figure 6.17: Partial One-Line Diagram Showing Two 112.5kVA Transformers 
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The TCC for this configuration is plotted in Figure 6.18 and this shows the circuit 
breaker (PD-XF-2) interrupting the arcing current at 0.027 seconds therefore reducing the 
incident and PPE Category. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18: TCC Showing Arc Flash Hazard at Panel L2 
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This chapter has focused on the introduction and implementation design 
techniques developed during this dissertation research intended to mitigate the arc flash 
hazard at specific locations in a 480 volt electrical distribution system. The four 
techniques were described and simulated in locations of an electrical system where a high 
arc flash hazard is typically present due to inherent properties of the system design. When 
applied as shown, these methods resulted in the ability to considerably decrease the arc 
flash hazard. While planning mission critical facilities, electrical design engineers can 
develop systems with lower arc flash hazards by implementing these techniques.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This work has been focused on techniques for mitigating arc flash hazard 
exposure in 600 volt and below electrical systems. The methodologies for fault current 
calculations, protective device coordination, and arc flash hazard analysis have been 
presented. Several of the mainstream arc flash mitigation products and techniques have 
been described. Case studies of existing facility arc flash studies have been presented 
along with the applied mitigation solutions. The theory of instituting design techniques 
with the goal of mitigating the arc flash hazard was developed and tested. 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
The impact of using four design techniques to decrease the arc flash hazard at 
specific locations in an electrical distribution system has been examined.  
1. When applying the National Electric Code, Article 230, Part VI, always 
specify a single main circuit breaker for building shutdown. 
The first design technique is applied at the electrical service entrance and is aimed 
at lowering the arc flash hazard at the main distribution panel. The simulation showed 
that when multiple electrical disconnects are used as permitted by NEC, Article 230, Part 
VI, the arc flash hazard can be extremely high. When designing the system with one main 
circuit breaker the main distribution panel has an interrupting device to limit the exposure 
of an arc flash. 
127 
 
The implementation of this design technique for this particular case decreased the 
arc flash incident energy from 47.6cal/cm2 to 0.95cal/cm2. This changed the PPE 
category from a Dangerous level down to a category 0. This allows a qualified technician 
to perform maintenance on this device with minimal arc-flash exposure. 
2. At the electrical service entrance the design shall specify enclosed low voltage 
power circuit breakers in place of fused disconnects. 
The second design technique is applied at the electrical service entrance and is 
also aimed at lowering the arc flash hazard at the main distribution panel. The simulation 
showed that sometimes when fused disconnects are used as permitted by NEC, Article 
230, Part VI, the arc flash hazard can be extremely high at the main distribution panel. 
When designing the system with a low voltage power circuit breaker with LSI 
adjustments as the main circuit breaker the exposure of an arc flash is limited. 
The implementation of this design technique for the particular case analyzed 
decreased the arc flash incident energy from 136cal/cm2 to 4.8cal/cm2. This changed the 
PPE category from a Dangerous level down to a category 2. This allows a qualified 
technician to perform maintenance on this device with minimal arc-flash exposure. 
3. Specify adjustable low voltage power circuit Breakers for protection of step-
down transformers rated above 125kVA. 
The third design technique is applied at a feeder circuit from the main distribution 
panel that is serving a step down transformer. The simulation showed that when a 
transformer larger than 125kVA is protected by a thermal magnetic breaker, the 
secondary side arc flash hazard can be extremely high. When designing the feeder with a 
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low voltage power circuit breaker with LSI adjustments the arc flash exposure can be 
mitigated to a safer level. 
The implementation of this design technique for this particular case decreased the 
arc flash incident energy from 23.3cal/cm2 to 0.6cal/cm2. This changed the PPE category 
from a category 3 level down to a category 0. This allows a qualified technician to 
perform maintenance on this device with minimal arc flash exposure. 
4. Step-Down Transformers larger than 125kVA shall be replaced with a design 
having two smaller kVA transformers. 
The fourth design technique is applied at a feeder circuit from the main 
distribution panel that is serving a step down transformer. The simulation showed that 
when a transformer larger than 125kVA is protected by a thermal magnetic breaker the 
secondary side arc flash hazard can be extremely high. When designing the feeder with 
two smaller circuits with reduced kVA transformers the arc flash hazard is reduced 
significantly. 
The implementation of this design technique for this particular case studied 
decreased the arc flash incident energy from 25.0cal/cm2 to 0.2cal/cm2. This changed the 
PPE category from a category 4 level down to a category 0. This allows a qualified 
technician to perform maintenance on this device with minimal arc-flash exposure. 
In all four cases the implementation of the recommended design technique has 
shown a significant decrease in the incident energy and hazard risk category. Table 7.1 
displays the cumulative results of all four methods for each particular case and 
summarizes the decrease of the arc flash hazard. 
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Table 7.1 Before and After Arc Flash Hazard 
Method 
# 
Before Incident Energy 
(cal/cm2) 
Before 
Category 
After Incident Energy 
(cal/cm2) 
After 
Category 
1 47.6 Dangerous 0.95 0 
2 23.3 3 0.6 0 
3 136 Dangerous 4.8 2 
4 25 4 0.2 0 
 
7.2 Further Work 
The application of these design techniques are based on the interpretation of the 
most current publications of NFPA-70E and IEEE-1584 and should be applied within that 
framework. There is a continued joint research effort by NFPA and IEEE to further the 
understanding of arc flash hazards. As this research is performed, new codes and 
standards are likely to be released in the future. The design techniques described in this 
work should be verified under any new releases of codes and standards.  
The design techniques described in this dissertation should be offered for 
continuing education to design engineers. If these methods become a part of the design 
process then the constructed electrical systems will have more flexibility to control arc 
flash hazards. 
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